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THE EU AS A GOOD GLOBAL ACTOR 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper outlines an exploratory workshop at City Law School, City, University of London funded by 
HEIF/ ‘EUTIP’ Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training Network (ITN) on understanding of the EU 
as a Good Global Actor.1 The EU has as its mission to be a good global governance actor yet is 
continuously challenged in the world. As a global actor, the EU is both a weak and strong actor in a 
divergent range of global governance areas. It is not comparable to study the EU as a global trade 
actor for example to its efforts in human rights, data, cyber or the environment. EU international 
relations constitutes arguably a booming field of law where the EU appears often to be a victim of its 
own success. The range of the subjects and objects of EU law continues to expand and the EU is 
arguably increasingly a victim of its own success, increasingly taking decisions with impacts on third 
countries or parties, subjecting more entities to sanctions regimes, being bound to consult more 
entities and have more third countries, parties and entities such as lobbyists interested in the directions 
of EU law. The assessment of the EU as a global actor includes broad checks on normative action ex 
ante and ex post facto- yet it is no less harsh. Ex ante metrics of EU global action include court-centred 
ones such as an opinion from the CJEU on legality of an international agreement, often precluded in 
most constitutional systems on account of its conflict with pacta sunt servanda. The contours of the 
principle of the autonomy of EU law have the capacity to put more stringent parameters on EU 
institutionalised evolutions as to international engagement. How can we assess the EU as a global 
actor given these realities? The aim of the event was to explore informally the nexus between trade 
and security, trade and economics and trade and human rights as a future research agenda with input 
from a variety of scholars It reflected upon four major themes: 1) The EU’s Contribution to the 
Democratisation of Global Governance 2) Deeper Trade Agreements and New Normative Foundations 
3) The EU as a Global Actor in Trade and Fundamental Rights 4) EU’s Trade in the Era of Global Data 
Flows. 
 
 
Keywords: EU trade; global governance; EU external relations; fundamental rights; data flows; 
EU as a Good Actor; democratisation; gender; labour; international relations; personal data; 
normative power; GDPR; Brexit 
 
 
                                               
1 The European Union Trade and Investment (EUTIP) project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 721916. 
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Session 1. The EU and Democratisation of Global Governance 
1. A Deep Agenda for Fundamental Rights in Trade Agreements 
Isabella Mancini, City Law School 
 
Introduction 
In a context of global backlash to globalisation and free trade, the EU strives to be a resilient “good 
global actor” pledging for a rules-based international order. Manifestation of this pursuit is its active 
engagement in a series of negotiations of trade agreements binding its trade partners to 
cooperation, good practices, institutionalisation and standards. The ensuing aim of deep 
integration with third countries forms the basis of what has been labelled the EU “deep” trade 
agenda. In this process of ambitious economic integration, it is shown that little is devoted to the 
protection of fundamental rights, with important implications for the emerging global economic 
governance. How does the EU, via its deep trade agreements, contribute to democratisation of 
international relations and global governance? What would “a deep agenda for fundamental rights 
in trade agreements” look like? Reflecting on these questions, Mancini provided a research agenda 
on the EU as a global actor in trade and fundamental rights, while shedding light on methodological 
and normative challenges.  
 
Mancini started off with the question of how to understand the EU ‘as a good global actor’. She 
claimed that, in her research, the way she understands this is the possibility for the EU to be a 
global actor that can make two agendas converge, namely trade and fundamental rights. And it is 
this convergence that she called ‘a deep trade agenda for fundamental rights’. The language of 
fundamental rights is typically not used in the context of free trade agreements, but they still come 
through under different configurations and demands.  
 
The discussions of fundamental rights have become the object of concrete concerns and a 
significant topic of public interest. Recently, in a joint proposal, France and the Netherlands 
demanded tougher enforcement of environmental and labour standards in new trade agreements.2 
They claim that the EU should police the activities of countries granted preferential access to its 
market. The Commissioner for Trade Phil Hogan has also recently emphasised in one of his 
speeches that EU will appoint a chief trade enforcement officer who will be expected, among other 
things, to strengthen the enforcement of sustainable development commitments on climate change 
and also labour rights.3 Labour rights have also been in the spotlight during the negotiation saga 
between the EU and the UK. The EU has so far demanded labour rights commitments while the 
UK has been reluctant for different reasons. Another aspect that has also gained prominence 
during the negotiations is the issue of data flows. The EU and the UK have realised that their trade 
relationship would also benefit from free flows of data, which the European Union yet conditions 
on the existence of adequate safeguards for the protection of personal data. This is just to show 
how fundamental rights enter into discussion when it comes to trade agreements. Most of the time 
the focus is really on enforcement. By contrast, Mancini believes that creating a sort of “harm-
proof” environment for fundamental rights in trade agreements can be the way forward.4 
 
EU Trade Agreements  Fundamental Rights 
Mancini considered how fundamental rights evolved and ‘intersected’ over time, and the way they 
                                               
2 See Jim Brunsden and Victor Mallet, ‘France and Netherlands call for tougher EU trade conditions’ (Financial Times, 4 May 
2020). 
3 Speech by Commissioner Phil Hogan at Launch of Public Consultation for EU Trade Policy Review (16 June 2020), available 
at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/hogan/announcements/speech-commissioner-phil-hogan-
launch-public-consultation-eu-trade-policy-review-hosted-eui-florence_en>. 
4 Mancini referred to the webinar “EU Trade Policy after Covid-19” organised by Trade Experettes and the European Centre for 
International Political Economy. During the webinar, Sabine Weyand (DG Trade) stated that “if we have to maintain open trade,  
we need to show that it does not go to the detriment of social and sustainable development issues.” It is unclear whether task 
would remain limited to showing that this does not happen or whether it would mean to embed mechanisms to this end. 
Importantly, she did not seem to be necessarily referring to detrimental effects on social issues abroad. Weyand might have been 
thinking about the detrimental effect on the domestic level, within the EU, having in mind all the contestation that happened with 
TTIP and CETA. This really provides fertile ground to discuss how we can think about fundamental rights in trade agreements. 
See ‘EU Trade Policy after Covid-19’ (28 May 2020) co-hosted by the Trade Experettes, ECIPE and Women in Trade Network 
in Brussels (<https://ecipe.org/events/eu-trade-policy-post-covid/>). 
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could evolve in the future.  
 
Past. Some may say that in the past the EU used to include human rights conditionality clauses in 
trade agreements. Yet, not all the agreements that the EU concluded with other countries contain 
conditionality clauses: these were especially opposed by developed countries. Even where they 
were included, they were not typically used. Mancini’s main critique is that the human rights 
conditionality clauses hugely focus on the trade partner and on the fact that the trade agreement 
can be used as a tool to export human rights abroad. These clauses are not necessarily connected 
to the trade agreement but they are something additional that the agreement can help to achieve.  
 
Present. Regarding the present, the new generation of EU trade agreements for the first time 
includes chapters on trade and sustainable development. When it comes to trade agreements 
between developed countries, however, these chapters are short sighted on a number of fronts, 
which go beyond issues of enforcement.5  
 
Future. Mancini pledged for a state of play whereby trade agreements and fundamental rights 
converge and mutually sustain each other, especially in the context of trade agreements that go 
significantly beyond tariffs alone.  
 
Given the latter potential scenario, Mancini turned to consider the new generation of EU trade 
agreements that the EU negotiated with developed countries. They are the result of the global 
Europe strategy. The strategy targeted developed advanced market economies in North America 
and Asia. These were the countries with which the EU wished to set the rules for globalisation and 
set global standards. The seeds of many trade agreements that have been concluded so far, such 
as the trade agreements with South Korea, Canada, Japan, Singapore (and also TTIP, had it been 
successful) can be found in this strategy. Over the time, these trade agreements have also been 
subject to other strategies, such as the ‘Trade For All’ strategy. Overall, the evolution of EU trade 
policy shows that the EU has been increasingly more ambitious in its trade agreements, especially 
in the degree of economic legal and institutional integration that it sought.  
 
A ‘Deep’ Trade Agenda for Fundamental Rights? 
In light of ‘deep’ trade agreements – which are more ambitious in their scope and wider in the 
reach – Mancini asks: what would ‘a deep agenda for fundamental rights’ mean and look like? She 
uses the term ‘deep’ and ‘deepness’ as a sort of methodological expedient, or device, to engage 
in an exploration of what would ensure that trade agreements do not adversely impact fundamental 
rights and the kind of safeguards that they could embed, as opposed to approaches that exclude 
any consideration on fundamental rights from the trade agreements. Starting from ‘deep’ trade 
agreements that go significantly beyond tariffs alone, her research intersects different levels and 
dimensions of the new generation EU trade agreements with fundamental rights. For each 
dimension, she performs a descriptive and normative exercise: she looks at ‘what is there’, and 
‘what should be there’ for fundamental rights. These dimensions include the scope, the actors on 
the negotiation stage, regulatory cooperation mechanisms and the chapters that create the 
institutional structure for the implementation of the agreement.  
 
Lastly, Mancini put some questions for further reflection: 
- How can the cross-cuttingness and the relationship between trade and fundamental rights 
be understood? How are they relevant to each other? 
- What goes/ can go into an FTA? What are the main limitations? 
- What is the EU’s contribution to democratisation of global governance? 
 
 
2. Metrics of the EU as a Good Global Actor 
Elaine Fahey, City Law School 
 
                                               
5 Isabella Mancini, ‘Fundamental Rights in the EU’s External Trade Relations: From Promotion ‘Through’ Trade Agreements to 
Protection ‘in’ Trade Agreements’ in Eva Kassoti and Ramses A Wessel (eds.), EU Trade Agreements and the Duty to Respect 
Human Rights Abroad (CLEER PAPERS 2020/1). 
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Introduction 
The EU has as its mission to be a good global governance actor yet is continuously challenged in 
the world. As a global actor, the EU is both a weak and strong actor in a divergent range of global 
governance areas. It is not comparable to study the EU as a global trade actor for example to its 
efforts in human rights, data, cyber or the environment. EU international relations constitute 
arguably a booming field of law where the EU appears often to be a victim of its own success. The 
range of the subjects and objects of EU law continues to expand and the EU is arguably 
increasingly a victim of its own success, increasingly taking decisions with impacts on third 
countries or parties, subjecting more entities to sanctions regimes, being bound to consult more 
entities and have more third countries, parties and entities such as lobbyists interested in the 
directions of EU law. The assessment of the EU as a global actor includes broad checks on 
normative action ex ante and ex post facto- yet it is no less harsh. Ex ante metrics of EU global 
action include court-centred ones such as an opinion from the CJEU on legality of an international 
agreement, often precluded in most constitutional systems on account of its conflict with pacta sunt 
servanda. The contours of the principle of the autonomy of EU law have the capacity to put more 
stringent parameters on EU institutionalised evolutions as to international engagement. How can 
we assess the EU as a global actor given these realities?  
 
Knowing when the EU is a Good Global Actor? On ‘Metrics’ of EU International Relations 
Law 
Fahey looked at the understanding the use of good global actor as well as the legal metrics 
problem. The EU is an extremely responsive legal actor, which makes it an interesting study from 
many perspectives questioning it as an entity ‘trying to do good’. Importantly, from a legal 
perspective, is how this has been set by other disciplines and subjects. The time, manner, place, 
and metrics - the basic communication devices. It is also important to note that lawyers and political 
scientists have come together in more recent times as to EU international relations. In more recent 
times, politicisation has come to the forefront, and in particular institutionalisation. It can be argued 
that the actor metrics of the EU’s actions and international relations have vastly opened up across 
subject areas. The metrics of international relations are extremely complex and extremely fluid and 
multifaceted.  
 
Who Evaluates art. 21 TEU Ex Ante, Ex Post Facto 
A slightly more refined way of consideration is just to bear in mind one of the extraordinary legal 
innovations of the EU Treaties is article 21 TEU. Here, the EU has a legal obligation to be a good 
global governance actor.  There is an extraordinary range of ex ante and ex post facto entities who 
get to evaluate this and there is a range of entities that need to be considered. For example, the 
European Parliament has increasingly important powers in international relations, although rarely 
litigates. There is an increasingly large number of subjects and objects involved in international 
relations law, for example lobbyists, and also countries that intervene to set the agenda of the EU. 
For example, just a few weeks ago the US intervened in the GDPR. Many third countries are 
entitled to appear before the CJEU but rarely intervene. Citizens also have increasingly important 
capacities to intervene under art.21 TEU. For example, the TTIP and CETA litigation was a good 
example of this. The national Parliaments are also interesting characters to consider regarding the 
breadth of their capacity to intervene. We only need to look at CETA before the Dutch Parliament 
or Mercosur in Ireland.  
 
Shifts in Subjects and Objects of EU IR Law Result in More Institutionalisation 
The EU international relations have an increasingly massive range of subjects and objects, 
arguably, the EU has become a victim of its own success. There is an increasingly broad range of 
administrative decisions addressed to individuals and entities and third countries; an increasingly 
broad number of individuals entrusted subject to EU sanctions regimes; an increasingly large 
number of situations where the EU needs to consult with third countries and parties; and 
increasingly high number of lobbyists work in Brussels; as well as large law firms, often American. 
There is an increasingly broad range of civil society understood within each new trade agreement 
- the constituency is broadened. The EU is increasingly burdened by the administration, it 
institutionalises to develop its subjects and objects. It is interesting to see how it absorbs this 
extraordinary shift.  
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EU as a Global Convergence Actor: Leads Spirit; Leads Convergence 
The EU as a global convergence actor is looked at in Fahey’s book “Framing Convergence with a 
Global Legal Order.”6 There are no normative claims rather a methodological way to reflect on the 
idea of cross-subjects and disciplines how the EU increasingly tries to lead the spirit of 
convergence, but always leaves through divergence. There is no shortage of examples as to 
finance financial services, labour, territoriality, unilateralism and generally global supply chains. 
The current status has to the WTO workarounds at the same time as the EU preaching the 
language of multilateralism respect for the WTO reform ‘bringing the US back to the table.’ But 
how is this dealt with as a matter of EU law? The methodology as a matter of international relations 
is fairly difficult: as a subject it is burdened by extreme positivism, hyper-legalisation and it has few 
constitutional moments. It can be said that this has few very critical points for reflection within it as 
a subject.  
 
Problem is Methodology in EU IR Law? Always Court-Centric in EU Law 
These are all very discrete challenges that the subject itself has had an enormous problem dealing 
with. In 2013 the CJEU celebrated its most activist decision with a ‘birthday party’ inviting the 
academics from all over the world. The CJEU has extraordinary powers in EU international 
relations law which are mostly unparalleled in national systems. Many systems do not provide in 
their constitutions for the ex ante opinion powers for example, because they violate pacta sunt 
servanda, and the principle of consent and agreement in international law. Unsurprisingly, the 
CJEU has largely thwarted all efforts as to institutionalisation in its use of its ex ante opinion 
powers. There were several decades of examples of this all falling under the rubric of the autonomy 
of EU law. The EU’s accession to the ECHR has featured the Court of Justice itself as part of the 
negotiation team that gets to strike down an opportunity as it were to accede to the ECHR even 
though it was mandated by the Member States and the Treaties. This leads to the question of how 
we understand institutionalisation and what types of parameters are possible for analytical review. 
The irrational paradoxes of power here cannot be lost on anyone looking at any other institutions, 
for example, the European Parliament. The European Parliament does not litigate international 
relations. There are two or three cases on pirates and individual parliamentarians have taken the 
lead in a limited number of cases e.g. by Sophie In’t Veld. The rise of national Parliaments in trade 
uprising over their last conferences, as evidence in the CETA, the Dutch Parliament are largely 
exceptional situations, completely unrelated to any alignment in the rise of the European 
Parliament. The incidents of institutionalisation in EU international relations were a very vibrant 
activity that needs more study, especially litigation of subjects and objects and their framing. More 
generally, the question of paradoxes and the bottom-up versus top-down actors are questions 
which are of enormous interest.  
 
 
3. Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance: The European Union’s 
Trade Labour Linkage in a Value Chain World 
James Harrison, University of Warwick 
 
Introduction 
Based on research to be published with Routledge in a co-authored inter-disciplinary book in 
September 2020,7 this presentation examined the issue of trade-labour linkage and how it can be 
made more effective in the future. Drawing on the global value chain literature, it focused on case 
studies of the European Union’s free trade agreements with the CARIFORUM group, South Korea 
and Moldova and their respective export industries of sugar, automobiles and clothing. Based on 
hundreds of interviews, the research shows how labour standards provisions were of marginal 
importance in the negotiation and implementation of these agreements. It also reveals that for 
workers in key export industries, the labour provisions were mismatched with their most pressing 
workplace concerns. At the same time, these concerns are exacerbated by the agreement’s 
commercial provisions. Harrison went on to explore how such agreements might in future be 
                                               
6 Elaine Fahey, Framing Convergence with the Global Legal Order (Hart Publishing 2020) 
7 Smith, Harrison, Campling, Richardson, Barbu, Free Trade Agreements and Global Labour Governance: The European Union’s 
Trade Labour Linkage in a Value Chain World (Routledge 2020).  
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reconstituted to better address the issues raised in the first half of the presentation.  
 
It was suggested that radical reform is needed to how labour provisions are conceptualised and 
implemented if they are to be fit for purpose in the 21st century, and that consideration of the 
differentiated issues raised by individual global value chains is central to this endeavour. It also 
suggested that lawyers need to take more seriously the idea of trade agreements as ‘living 
instruments’ whose legal provisions are reliant on the institutions and individuals charged with 
implementing them, if they are to understand the impacts of commitments in trade agreements in 
the real world. 
 
Harrison focused on the trade-labour linkage in European Union free trade agreements. As set out 
in the “Trade for All” Strategy document: labour provisions in the EU’s new generation trade 
agreements are vital to the Commission's conception of itself as a good actor through trade policy. 
They ensure that trade is not just about interests but also about values and that economic growth 
goes hand in hand with higher labour standards.8 The EU is a global actor because its labour 
standards agenda is based on global values, particularly the ILO Core Conventions, rather than 
specifically European ones. It can claim to be using its normative power (to use Ian Manners’ term) 
to affect change by diffusing shared expectations through the international system. Yet, it is 
important to empirically test these claims. Often legal scholarship simply ‘examines the text on the 
page’ and on that basis comes to conclusions about the nature of legal obligations. A key 
contention of Harrison et al’s book is that trade agreements are living instruments and that trade 
policy must be implemented in diverse national settings. It is that process of implementation which 
is critical to providing us with meaningful lessons about the importance or not of legal obligations.  
 
Harrison asked three questions: 
 
- Do labour provisions make trade ‘not just about interests but also about values’? 
- How has the EU’s approach to conceptualising and organising civil society been 
externalised through its trade policy? 
- How should fundamental rights be conceptualised in trade agreements in the future? 
 
The book presents case studies of the European Union's free trade agreements with the 
CARIFORUM states, with South Korea and Moldova. Based on hundreds of interviews, it shows 
how labour standards provisions were of marginal importance in the negotiation and 
implementation of these agreements. It finds that government officials from trade saw labour 
provisions as externally imposed and not their responsibility. Their focus was on more pressing 
and immediate concerns, including adherence to commercial provisions of the agreement. At the 
same time, the EU officials had very limited conception of their role with regard to labour provisions 
and very limited understanding of domestic labour struggles in trade partners, making them largely 
powerless to push for changes to domestic labour law and practice. Secondly, drawing on the 
global value chain literature, key export industries of sugar in Guyana, automobiles in South Korea 
and clothing in Moldova are considered. It is assumed that it was these industries where the 
influence of EU trade policy would be likely to register. Each industry is examined as to the extent 
to which the labour provisions had meaningful purchase on labour standards issues. This analysis 
reveals that for workers in key export industries the labour provisions were mismatched with their 
most pressing workplace concerns. At the same time these concerns were exacerbated by the 
agreements’ commercial provisions.  
 
Guyanese Dependence on Sugar Exports 
In Guyana, the closures of Sugar Estates, the country’s single biggest employer, was significantly 
influenced by changing trade relations with the EU and the downturn in sugar exports. This led to 
economic dislocation and political discontent. The trade agreement with the EU, with its focus on 
niche export opportunities and appeals to social dialogue, was simply unable to mitigate such trade 
induced dynamics on this section of the Guyanese workforce.  
 
                                               
8 ‘Trade for all - Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy’ (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European  
Union, 2014) available at <https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf> 
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South Korea Export-Oriented Automobile Production and the EU 
In South Korea, the commercial provisions of the agreement shifted competitive conditions in the 
Korean auto market, contributing to an influx of imports and the erosion of the Hyundai Motor 
Group, Korea's largest auto manufacturer’s, profits. This threatened to create adverse impacts on 
workers in the more insecure and low paid jobs, especially those located in the lower-tier of 
production network. 
 
Moldova, EU Production Network and the Clothing Value Chain 
In Moldova, as tariff barriers were reduced, exports particularly to the UK and Italy, increased. This 
created more jobs for a workforce that consists of 90% women. There was a positive impact on 
female participation in the workforce. But pressure from lead firms in the UK and Italy, combined 
with weaknesses in labour protection system in Moldova, also led to the entrenchment of poverty 
wages and heavy reliance on piece-rate payments and other troubling overtime practices and 
production methods.  
 
These empirical findings show the importance of studying the thicker multiplicity of connections 
which trade agreements produce, as a result of the cross-border activities of firms and other 
economic actors – what the book terms ‘the trade-labour nexus’. Here, there were serious and 
sometimes negative impacts of trade agreements on workers in the sectors studied.  
 
EU’s Approach to Conceptualising and Organising Civil Society 
The labour provisions discussed are contained within the Trade and Sustainable Development 
(TSD) Chapters. These are integrally linked to the civil society mechanisms of the trade 
agreements. In the book, Harrison et al. also investigate the role of civil society in relation to trade 
policy, reflecting on the consequences of the formal inscription of civil society actors into the TSD 
chapters of EU trade agreements. It is found that the claim that the EU here acts as a global actor 
is much weaker. Unlike, in relation to labour standards which are based on global values and ILO 
Core conventions, its approach to conceptualising and organising civil society is a European one: 
a tripartite structure composed of employers’ representatives, employees’ representatives and 
various other interest groups. When this model is mapped onto diverse trading settings, the ‘our-
size-fits-all’ model creates serious problems. These are captured by considering the politics of 
representation: who is a representative entity in these diverse trading partner settings becomes 
problematic. 
 
How should we think of fundamental rights in trade agreement and their addressees in the 
future? 
There are four insights from Harrison’s research in relation to this question. First, there is a need 
to conceptually label labour rights as an intrinsic aspect of trade policy-making. As the analysis 
has shown, trade agreements have profound impacts on workers. There is a need to move away 
from seeing labour rights as an agenda extrinsic to trade which policymakers have charitably 
agreed to take some action upon, and move towards an agenda that trade policy has a strong duty 
to address, if EU trade policymakers are to be considered good global actors. Second, we need to 
engage with real world trade issues in specific value chains. The EU’s model has failed to connect 
with differentiated labour struggles in its trade partners. As a result, many issues – including those 
in relation to key export industries – have been unexplored as well as unaddressed. This needs to 
change for good global action to occur. Third, there is a need to consider rights issues within the 
EU. The trade linkage could be made more internationalist by recognising the universality of labour 
struggles. There are plenty of opportunities to do this, including by operationalising labour 
standards provision within the EU in ways that speak directly to the trade-labour nexus. For 
instance, examining labour standards in global value chains, led by firms and trade partner 
countries such as the Korean Hyundai Motor Group plants in Czechia, and Slovakia, or examining 
the treatment of workers who have migrated into the EU from places like Guyana and Moldova, or 
been unfairly denied the right to do so. 
 
Most fundamentally and radically, there is a need to rethink the language and actors of trade policy. 
Harrison argues for a paradigm shift and the very idea of what trade agreements are. It is already 
recognised by the mainstream trade community that modern trade agreements are transitioning 
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from instruments of liberalisation to instruments of regulation, reflecting the changing basis of 
capitalist production. Building on the existing integration of economic space between states, they 
cover an ever-expanding array of regulatory issues from intellectual property rights and food 
standards to state subsidies and data privacy. There is merit in correcting the misapprehension 
created by applying the misnomer of trade agreements to such treaties. Referring to them under a 
different nomenclature, for instance ‘international co-operation treaties’, would then better reflect 
their breadth of coverage. It could also alter the terms of the debate and the actors involved in 
ways that make a significant difference to what such treaties seek to achieve. It could challenge 
the assumption that the increased movement of goods and services ought to be valued for its own 
sake and raise distributive questions about the costs and benefits of international exchange out of 
the ghetto of non-trade issues. It could also create a greater role for governments and departments 
or Directorate Generals (DGs) in the European context, focused on labour, development, social 
affairs and the environment, bringing different governance networks and outlooks to bear on 
policymaking. This shift could lead to a much richer concept of what it means to be a good global 
actor, and a far better chance that trade will work for all. 
 
 
4. Doing Good vs Not Doing Bad: Duties and Baselines in Bilateral Trade Agreements  
Oisin Suttle, Maynooth University 
 
Introduction 
What are the appropriate normative criteria for assessing the EU’s approach to Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) negotiations? Assuming negotiations are both morally and practically optional, 
on what basis can we identify whether a resulting agreement meets relevant normative criteria? 
And to what extent do disagreements about those criteria impede their practical political 
evaluation?  
 
Note first that the premises of moral and practical optionality are potentially controversial. Moral 
optionality assumes that the ‘no-FTA’ baseline is itself morally unobjectionable (or at least, that 
any moral defects are not of a kind to be remedied by an FTA). In many cases, however, this will 
not be the case: defects in existing institutions may make some change morally required, and an 
FTA may be one way to effect this change. This raises difficult questions about the permissibility 
of protectionism that I won’t try to answer here (see the final chapter of my Distributive Justice and 
World Trade Law (2017) for some initial reflections on this).9 Practical optionality assumes that the 
no-FTA baseline is reasonably acceptable to both parties, such that they can genuinely ‘take it or 
leave it’. Again, this may not hold, particularly in cases (ACP EPAs, Brexit) where the no-FTA 
position is in fact significantly worse than the status quo, and various actors may have formed 
expectations (legitimate or otherwise) and implemented long term plans on the assumption that 
particular market access would continue.  
 
Moral and practical optionality may both also be challenged by the multi-player nature of the FTA 
system. Morally, we might hold, for example, that a country was entitled to whatever unilateral 
trade policy it chose, but that entering into an FTA with one partner generated obligations (of 
fairness / impartiality / non-discrimination etc) to at least seek to find a similar agreement with 
willing others. Practically, we might recognize that concerns for trade diversion mean that entering 
into an FTA with one trade partner may have adverse impacts for others who do not do the same, 
rendering such agreements non-optional as a practical matter. We might also highlight how path-
dependence and similar mechanisms, combined with the increasing emphasis of FTAs on 
regulatory and other ‘behind-the-border’ issues mean that FTAs will restrict the options 
subsequently open to both participants and non-participants. With those caveats, we might posit a 
number of approaches to normatively evaluating FTA negotiations and/or their results:  
 
Anything Goes  
FTAs are optional, if states do not like what is on offer they can decline to participate. To the extent 
they participate, their content is legitimized by state consent, and there is nothing more to be said 
                                               
9 Oisin Suttle, Distributive Justice and World Trade Law (2017). 
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on the matter. 
 
Process and Pressure 
FTAs are objectionable to the extent that their negotiation involved the application of illicit 
pressures or incentives of various kinds. Bribing officials, threatening the withdrawal of (morally 
non-optional) development or military aid, etc. Concerns of transparency and effective democratic 
oversight may also fit here. The same substantive agreement may be objectionable or non-
objectionable, depending on the manner of its negotiation.  
 
Substantive Imbalance 
FTAs are objectionable to the extent that they result in an uneven distribution of benefits and 
burdens (formal or substantive) between the states involved. The underlying concern here might 
be expressed in terms of exploitation, but that argument is likely to depend significantly on casting 
doubt on the two aspects of optionality noted above. Alternatively, it may be grounded in a 
substantive egalitarian view, but to the extent this is the case, it is likely to have implications 
significantly beyond the terms of FTAs (and as regards FTAs, may motivate a requirement that 
benefits and burdens be distributed unequally so as to benefit the less advantaged). Again, that 
may ultimately mean challenging the moral optionality of such agreements.  
 
Protected Interests Side-Constraints 
FTAs are objectionable to the extent that they adversely impact, or fail to protect / advance, 
particular protected interests, whether in participating states or non-participants. The relevant 
interests might include human rights, vulnerable groups, environment, self-determination and so 
on. The key distinction between this and the substantive balance view is that it is concerned with 
threshold / sufficientarian claims, rather than comparative / egalitarian ones. An agreement, for 
example, which undermined effective self-determination in both participating countries (perhaps 
because it incorporated ISDS provisions) would be objectionable on this ground, regardless of how 
the economic benefits of that agreement were distributed. An important question that views 
adopting this approach will need to answer relates to the distribution of responsibilities for these 
various protected interests, and the extent of responsibility for indirect effects / under- and 
overdetermined outcomes etc.  
 
At this level of generality, it seems that our evaluation of any given FTA will depend significantly 
on our underlying normative commitments: those attracted by ideals of national responsibility and 
voluntarist obligation will ask very different questions to those endorsing a morality of human rights 
or a cosmopolitan egalitarianism. This will be troubling for anyone hoping to build a politically 
effective critique of such agreements. However, more optimistically, it seems likely that in many 
cases the concerns of these different perspectives will cluster: an agreement that undermines 
human rights will likely also disproportionately advantage the already more advantaged and 
emerge from a process that is power-based, exploitative and non-transparent – the upshot being 
that there may be scope for building wider coalitions around or against particular aspects of FTAs, 
without necessarily reaching agreement on these more contestable underlying questions. (The 
language of incompletely theorized agreement and overlapping consensus may be helpful here.) 
 
Suttle discussed the criteria relevant and that are applied to the concepts of justice and fairness of 
trade agreements. His argument is motivated by a puzzling intuition of an unfair trade agreement. 
It is usually assumed that agreements are voluntarily entered into. In order to conclude that an 
agreement is unfair its terms are evaluated. He first looks at idea of voluntariness or optionality (a 
lot of intuitions are driven by doubts about the extent to which these are truly optional from either 
side); secondly, assuming that they are truly optional, he thinks about the criteria that 
notwithstanding the optionality might be applied.  
 
When talking about trading especially international agreements more generally, voluntariness may 
be thought of in two ways. Suttle characterises this as moral and practical voluntariness. Moreover, 
moral boundary as being the sense that one is morally free to enter or to refrain from entering into 
agreement. And the assumption driving that is that the non-agreement status quo is in itself morally 
unobjectionable or at least to the extent it is objectionable, it is not objectionable in a way that can 
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be remedied through entering into an agreement of this kind. If there is an existing injustice that 
entering this field would remedy, then the agreement itself seems to be morally non-optional. 
Presumably, there is an obligation to do what can be done to address those injustices to the extent 
or responsible for them. These trade agreements may be characterised as morally non-optional 
that sense for various reasons. The most obvious ones being either that one has a substantive 
view around the injustice of particular trade policies that might be remedied through a trade 
agreement. Alternatively, some sort of compensatory claim according to which there are justice-
related to what has happened in the past. This idea seems to fit quite well with something like the 
ACP relationship. Secondly, practical voluntariness which is just the sense that one is, in practical 
terms, free to agree or not to agree. Sometimes, there is simply no alternative, so there is no 
realistic option to walk away. This sort of language and analysis seems most plausible in cases of 
agreements where a non-agreement point is significantly worse than status quo, e.g. Brexit – post-
Brexit trade agreement with the EU may be seen as non-optional to highlight the extent that no 
gains will be achieved; rather, more people will be ‘worse off’ in terms of their economic activities 
if such agreement is not entered into.  
 
From moral optionality to practical optionality  
Moral optionality and practical optionality may tie together in various ways. Looking at trade 
agreements to express concerns, driving our analysis is a sense that actually the agreements are 
not optional in other of those ways. Assuming that this is not hard to make it sensible, looking at 
non-optional agreements then evaluating those in fairness terms. What if we ground the 
assumption of voluntariness – the assumption that is probably one that is made by many of those 
who are directly/indirectly involved in negotiations. Even granting that there are some various 
different attitudes or criteria one might adopt, one characterises anything goes and picks up the 
idea that a lot of foreign relations law is characterised with the language of extreme positivism.  
 
There are questions that we can ask about almost any account of laws based on voluntary 
obligation – the questions familiar to domestic contract lawyers, questions about the reasons for 
consent generating obligation, about the extent to which consent generates application across 
different legal subjects, questions about the types of obligations that can and cannot be endorsed 
and taken on through consent. Importantly, when consent is invoked to legitimise legal obligation, 
international economic legal obligation, to do so to the extent to which is implausible if you actually 
drill to the reasons why we think consent has that moral effects. One can think of the fairness of 
an agreement in terms of the process through which they are brought about. There are various 
distinctions that can be drawn in terms of the ways processes and concerns are invoked to 
problematize trade agreements. One can also think in terms of the dimensions along which 
pressure incentives are applied: whether it is too much pressure, the coerced agreement, but also 
on whom pressure is applied. Pressure applied to states as economic goals versus pressure 
applied to particular decision-makers and which undermines the extent to which we regard the 
endorsement by those decision-makers as binding the states concerned. Thirdly, what Suttle labels 
as benefits, burdens and balancing. This is actually the substantive balance of distributive effects 
of an agreement primarily between the states concerned and this is a matter of globally egalitarian 
language – the language that concerns exploitation. He suggests that it is hard to articulate a 
convincing argument for a fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of a trade agreement which 
is not either invoking some concern with practical voluntariness (with kind of exploitation type 
arguments) or expressing a substantive commitment to global equality. This as a result does not 
really have any say about trade agreements. Fourthly, essentially human rights sort of arguments. 
Their relevance is very straightforward to understand because these are characterised moral 
claims which bind the individual states in their activities and therefore it is clear why there might 
also be applicable to agreements between states.  
 
 
5. The Democratisation of the Common Commercial Policy and the Role of the 
European Parliament in Shaping the EU as a Normative Power in International 
Economic Relations.  
Ewa Żelazna, University of Leicester 
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Introduction 
The Treaty of Lisbon has provided the EU with tools that enabled it to enhance environmental and 
human rights protection standards in its trade agreements. The development has inspired a revival 
of debates about the EU’s normative power in international economic relations. The reformed 
provisions on the common commercial policy also strengthened the position of the European 
Parliament. Since their entry into force, the Parliament has played a proactive part in scrutinising 
negotiations on new generation FTAs and has supported further deepening of commitments to 
fundamental rights and environmental protection. While the influence of the European Parliament 
in international trade has increased, the expansion of the Union’s competences has resulted in 
reduced role of national parliaments in conclusion of agreements that fall within the scope of the 
common commercial policy. Thus far, the European Parliament has voted in favour of all new 
generation FTAs negotiated by the EU, which can be contrasted with concerns voiced by national 
parliaments in Belgium and Netherlands to the conclusion of CETA. Against this background, the 
paper critically evaluates the contribution of the Treaty of Lisbon to the democratisation of the 
common commercial policy and the role of the European Parliament in shaping the EU’s trade and 
sustainable development agenda. 
 
The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty 
Żelazna focused on the treaty-making procedure, particularly on the role of the European 
Parliament as well as the role of national parliaments in shaping the content of the EU’s 
international economic policy. The Treaty of Lisbon has made two very important contributions to 
the EU’s external economic action. First of all, it improved the effectiveness of the EU as an actor 
in the field by expanding the scope of the common commercial policy (art.207 TFEU), and 
consolidating the treaty-making procedure in art.218 TFEU. Secondly, the Treaty of Lisbon gave 
the Union's trade policy a new normative impetus by enhancing the role of the European 
Parliament, and imposing the requirement (art.21 TEU) that the EU’s external action in all areas 
should be guided by its founding principles and pursue objectives, such as support for democracy 
respect for human rights, sustainable development, etc. There seems to be a broad consensus in 
the literature that since the European Parliament became an actor in the common commercial 
policy, it asserted a strong position and was able to effectively scrutinise the Commission in 
negotiations on the new generation FTAs (NGFTAs).10  
 
The European Parliament in the CCP 
Żelazna has analysed the contribution of the European Parliament to negotiations on the new 
generation FTAs, in the past 10 years.11 She concluded that the European Parliament has 
proactively used its powers throughout the negotiating process. The Parliament consistently used 
available opportunities to state its position at key stages of negotiations. In its non-legislative 
resolutions, it promoted transparency by encouraging the Commission and the Council to make 
negotiating mandates publicly available, and improved legitimacy by insisting that the Council does 
not adopt negotiating directives before the European Parliament has had a chance to express its 
views. Moreover, the Parliament protected its own prerogatives by frequently reminding the 
Commission to keep it fully informed. Lastly, the Parliament expressed consent to a number of 
new generation FTAs, which since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is a formal 
requirement of the ratification procedure of treaties that fall within the scope of in the common 
commercial policy.  
 
In general, the Parliament has developed a good cooperation with the Commission, as the DG 
Trade and the INTA Committee regularly engage in a constructive dialogue about the 
developments in the common commercial policy. In relation to the substance of the new generation 
FTAs, the Parliament has assumed the role of guardian of human rights, labour standards, 
sustainability and environmental protection. It frequently emphasised in its non-legislative 
resolutions that trade liberalisation should not be only a goal of the EU trade policy, but also a 
                                               
10 See for example: Juan Santos Vara, ‘The European Parliament in the Conclusion of International Agreements post-Lisbon: 
Entrenched between Values and Prerogatives’ in Juan Santos Vara and Soledad Rodríguez Sánchez-Tabernero (eds), The 
Democratisation of EU International Relations through EU Law (Routledge 2019); Youri Devuyst, ‘European Union Law and 
Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Trade Agreements’ (2013) 12 J Int’l Bus & L 259, 290-290. 
11 Ewa Żelazna, ‘The Participation of the European Parliament in the Conclusion of the New Generation Free Trade Agreements: 
A Ten- year Perspective’ LAwTTIP Working Papers 2018/6.  
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mean to promote other values, in particular those enshrined in art.21 TEU. The Parliament made 
a valuable contribution through its non-legislative resolutions to the realisation of these objectives. 
Its participation in the EU international treaty-making practice has reinforced trade and 
sustainability commitments and human rights provisions, contributing to the shaping of the EU’s 
character as a normative power through trade.  
 
Opposition to NGFTAs at the National Level 
Notwithstanding the European Parliament's efforts to improve the sustainability and human rights 
aspects of the new generation FTAs, the agreements, especially the high-profile ones, have been 
strongly contested by the civil society. There were a number of public protests in the European 
capitals against the TTIP and CETA. German citizens challenged the agreement before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. Some of the concerns that were directly expressed by the 
citizens resonated in the parliaments of the Member States. The Parliament of Wallonia refused 
the signature of CETA and, recently, the agreement also barely passed through the Dutch House 
of Representatives. The members of the French Parliament challenged CETA before the 
Constitutional Council and, in November 2019, in a symbolic vote the Irish Parliament rejected the 
Mercosur Agreement. The national parliaments expressed similar concerns about the new 
generation free trade agreements, which include their negative impact on environmental protection 
and safety standards, the unwanted competition in the agricultural sector and investor- state 
dispute resolution system. The opposition from the civil society and the national parliaments to the 
new generation FTAs warrants the question whether the European Parliament sufficiently 
represents the voice of EU citizens. Żelazna claims that while the Parliament is rather successful 
in this task, the diverse voices of national parliaments should not be dismissed too easily. The 
contestation from a large number of parties contributing to the discussion about the EU trade 
policy, if coordinated in an appropriate way, does not have to lead to undermining of the EU’s 
position on the international scene, but can lead to a better policy-making. 
 
The Current Practice of Concluding NGFTAs  
However, the EU has adopted a different approach that is going in the direction of dispensing with 
the involvement of the national parliaments in conclusion of the new generation FTAs. Despite this 
trend, the national parliaments have used different avenues in order to have their voices heard. 
The recent conclusion of the EU-Vietnam FTA is an interesting example. The FTA is an EU-only 
agreement, its ratification thus requires only the decision of the Council and the consent of the 
European Parliament. Nevertheless, in this case, the decision of the Council contains two 
addenda, which include declarations from Spain, Netherlands and Belgium that emphasise the 
importance of trade and sustainable development chapters and encourage Vietnam to ratify ILO 
Conventions. It is a positive development that the national parliaments are trying to explore 
different options for being involved in the process of concluding trade agreements, but Żelazna 
doubts whether these declarations will impact on the policymaking at the EU level and poses a 
question whether there is a more meaningful way to incorporate voices of national parliaments in 
the process.  
 
 
6. Leverage in the negotiation of international trade agreements 
Maria Garcia, University of Bath 
 
Introduction  
The EU's market size has been effectively used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with 
developing states. In PTAs, and especially through the GSP Plus scheme, the EU has made 
preferential access to the EU market conditional on accepting key human rights, labour and 
environmental standards. Although penalties under the GSP scheme have been rare and require 
a high burden of proof to be applied (Portela & Orbie 2014, Portela 2016), the scheme does include 
mechanisms for enforceability, that in the case of labour and environmental standards are absent 
from PTAs. The EU's 'essential clauses' on democracy and human rights, that have underpinned 
its trade agreements since the 1990s are also under increased pressure. Whilst they were included 
in the agreements with Singapore and Canada, the former included a side letter where the EU 
accepted that the present situation in Singapore complies with the essential clause. In the case of 
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Canada, EU officials reassured reluctant Canadian negotiators that the EU would not use that 
clause to contest issues relating to First Nations in Canada. This raises important questions as to 
how the EU can pursue its normative agenda through trade agreements, and its obligations under 
the Treaty of Lisbon, in cases where it lacks the tremendous asymmetric power and leverage that 
it has vis-à-vis developing states. Where can leverage be created? How can 
human/labour/environmental rights be mainstreamed into agreements in a scenario of weakening 
leverage? 
 
Inherent Tension at Heart of EU Trade Policy 
Garcia focuses on the challenges of gaining acquiescence from third parties to the use normative 
aims and agendas in new generation trade agreements. She uses examples from the agreements 
with Asian and American partners, as these are the parts of the world where the EU's approach to 
linking trade to perceived non-trade norms (such as human rights, labour and environment) are 
more contested, and areas where the international relations literature tells us that the EU has less 
leverage or less power directly. Borrowing from the international relations and negotiations 
literature, and also to turn to the EU as an international power, we can identify a number of sources 
of the new power and leverage in trade agreement negotiations. Firstly, with all of its trade partners 
to date, with the notable exception of the United States, and especially with regards to developing 
partners, the EU has significant structural power over its partners derived from the partners’ greater 
economic dependence on trade and investment from the EU. This derives from the EU Single 
Market: its size, its regulatory capacity and also its ability to export its standards as firms from other 
countries want to engage in the European market.  
 
Sources of Leverage-Institutional 
Moreover, the European Union also benefits from a number of other institutional sources of 
leverage in negotiations. They derive additional power from the fact that the EU has constraints. 
Sophie Meunier has demonstrated how the fact that the EU negotiators are bound by the Member 
States’ mandate has been beneficial to the EU in negotiations with the US over issues of the WTO 
in the past. More recently, the threat of a veto from the European Parliament can also serve as 
increasing the use of leverage in negotiations. The European Parliament in the last decade has 
taken a very strong stance through its resolutions on human rights and trade agreements. In its 
resolutions on a number of negotiations, notably with Vietnam, Colombia or India, the Parliament 
has made it very clear that it requires a human rights linkage in order to approve a trade agreement. 
It supports, or would support, more legally-binding trade and sustainable development chapters 
and on the environment. Additionally, the EU has sufficient resources and capacity for negotiations, 
which gives it more leverage over partners. It has also made ‘clever’ use of issue-linkages not least 
to gain acquiescence for its demands in normative areas. Importantly, Clarke et al succinctly show 
that leverage in bargaining is enhanced when one is able to impose the cost of delay in negotiations 
on the other, whilst being insensitive to the cost yourself. Garcia argues that it is this last element 
of leverage that seems to be missing and will be missing more in the future. It dilutes some of the 
possibilities for the EU to impose stronger social and human rights linkages and conditionalities in 
its trade agreements. 
 
Normative Linkages in Trade Policy 
Looking at human rights conditionality, particularly in more recent years, the EU does not 
necessarily include it in trade agreements; rather, in framework agreements (or political 
cooperation agreements) that are negotiated and signed alongside trade agreements. Respect for 
human rights, rule of law and democracy are all part of the essential clause. There is a non-
execution clause which enables appropriate measures to be taken should there be a breach of 
these human rights. However, in most agreements there is no definition of what appropriate 
measures would be, or what would constitute a breach of these rights. It is important to note that 
privileges under a trade agreement have never been cancelled on the basis of human rights. 
Worryingly, in the EU-Singapore Political Cooperation Agreement, Singapore convinced the 
European Union to agree to a side-letter whereby the EU accepts existing human rights and 
democracy practices in Singapore and that it will not use the PCA or trade agreement to contest 
that. More recently, in the Canada Strategic Partnership, for the first time it has been recorded that 
an appropriate measure in case of a breach of human rights would be to suspend trade preferences 
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under CETA. For the first time, the EU specifies what such a breach in human rights would be: it 
is specified as “a coup d’état or measures that threaten the peace and well-being of the 
international community.” It is a narrow understanding of a breach of human rights. (Meissner and 
McKenzie) The inclusion of this linkage to human rights, which Canada strongly opposed and saw 
as demeaning, is linked to the European Parliament and its insistence on having consistency 
across all trade agreements. Actually, the Canadian negotiators (at least in an informal interview) 
seem to be happy with the wording because it provides them with the reassurances that they 
wanted. The agreement would not be used by the EU or by other groups to contest Canadian 
indigenous rights, the clubbing of baby seals or other issues that are ‘a little thorny’. This shows 
how the position of the other is important in perhaps watering down more ambitious normative 
claims on the part of the EU.  
 
Garcia highlighted that there is evidence that where the EU has the greatest leverage, and when 
partners also have the greatest leverage, is during the negotiations; before the agreement is 
signed, hence before actual trade preferences are granted. Here there is some evidence of the EU 
leveraging. The European Parliament has used delays: for instance, it has delayed the ratification 
of the Vietnam Agreement and conditioned it on Vietnam engaging more with the EU, signing up 
to the ILO Conventions and making changes to their labour code (which Vietnam did do in 
November 2019). Having said that, Human Rights Watch complains that the treatment of 
journalists and political dissidence are still unacceptable and that there are changes to be made to 
the Penal Code in order for Vietnam to be able to adhere to core ILO Convention 87 (has not done 
yet). That has not stopped the European Parliament from ratifying the agreement. Similarly, in the 
ratification of the Peru-Columbia Trade Agreement, the European Parliament insisted on Peru and 
Colombia to decide on human rights roadmaps that would be monitored due to concerns over the 
treatment and murder of Trade Union representatives in Colombia. The agreement has come into 
place yet murders of Trade Unions representatives sadly continue. Although Colombia has formally 
accepted these issues and has changed its Labour Code, it does not necessarily have the capacity 
to monitor its proper implementation throughout the entirety of the Colombian territory. There are 
other complicating issues that make this more difficult to have an impact in practice. 
 
The EU’s leverage is limited because it ‘has a cost to bear.’ All these trade agreements have been 
signed on the heels of US Trade agreements, with the exception of the Vietnam Agreement. 
However, participation in CPTPP does give Canadian and Japanese competitors extra access to 
the Vietnamese market. For the EU, there is a geo-economic component to making sure that its 
businesses can access other markets under the same circumstances as key competitors. 
Increasingly, the EU is also aware of its own power given in relative significance of emerging 
powers to other economies and other partners and with Brexit looming that will reduce the market 
size and appeal of the European market. The EU has also publicly positioned itself as a defender 
for liberal trading order. It makes approval of trade agreements and finalisation of negotiations, 
perhaps more-time sensitive than it would otherwise and limits the leverage that it has. This means 
that, going forward, it will be difficult for the EU to increase its leverage in trade negotiations. The 
focus needs to be more on the implementation. The EU has already taken steps to improve 
implementation. It has caught the first Dispute Settlement against Korea on issues of labour under 
a trade and sustainable development clause. But it will have to work more closely in the future with 
the private sector on issues of supply chains, certification of corporate social responsibility and 
also more careful drafting of other chapters like ISDS or intellectual property, which can impact 
social rights.  
 
 
7. EU FTAs and Gender-Sensitive Trade Policies  
Claire Gammage, University of Bristol 
 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the normative foundations of the EU’s external 
action with a focus on the linkage between trade and gender in EU FTAs. Of the nearly 300 trade 
agreements in force, 75 trade agreements contain at least one clause referring to ‘gender’ or 
‘women’ and 243 include a gender-related clause referring to issues such as human rights or 
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sustainable development. In this respect, the linkage of trade and gender is not new. However, 
following the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which identifies 
the economic empowerment of women as integral to inclusive and sustainable growth, there has 
been a paradigmatic shift toward the inclusion of gender chapters in trade agreements. Gender 
intersects with many other issue-linkages in trade agreements including labour standards, 
investment, agriculture, environment and e-commerce. Furthermore, trade and gender raise 
complex questions about how to regulate and protect women working in both the formal and 
informal economies. This paper has three aims. First, the paper aims to critically interrogate 
whether the inclusion of gender clauses in EU-FTAs marks a novel and innovative turn in the EU’s 
approach to trade policymaking. Second, the paper will examine the extent to which EU-FTAs 
recognise the interconnections between gender and other issue-linkages. It is argued that the EU 
adopts a ‘silo-thinking’ approach, wherein each chapter of the FTA is treated as conceptually 
distinct from other chapters. The failure to identify the intersections between trade and gender (and 
gender and other issue linkages) weakens the innovative potential of FTAs and undermines the 
EU’s normative claims to promote the economic empowerment of women in its external trade 
policies. Finally, the paper identifies examples of good practice from intra-African regional 
economic communities to illustrate how FTAs might be harnessed as tools to promote the 
(economic) empowerment of women.  
 
Gammage focused on the role of the EU as a normative actor, more specifically on EU FTAs and 
sustainable development as well as labour standards, and environmental provisions within those 
agreements. Her current work focuses on the inclusion of gender chapters or clauses within free 
trade agreement and the EU's push towards doing so within its own FTAs. The question is whether 
the EU is not only a normative actor, but could it also be a feminist normative actor or a gendered 
normative actor? In other words, is it appropriate that the EU is seeking to include gender 
provisions within its FTAs? Is the way in which it is seeking to do so the most appropriate? Is this 
just an attempt to pink-wash the FTAS - merely by including a commitment towards gender 
equality? Whilst there is a commitment to achieve gender equality in by 2030, it is probably 
unsurprising that no country in the world is on track to achieve it. The discussions about gender 
and trade, and the intersections between gender and trade, investment, services, intellectual 
property and all of these other aspects of FTAs, are generally not new. Still, it is perhaps surprising 
that not much has been done previously in terms of mainstreaming gender across the FTA itself. 
If the EU is thought about as a normative actor, it is useful to think why it might choose to act in a 
good way or in a normative manner. A part of that is shown through international relations 
scholarship and through legal scholarship. There is a significant role for creating hierarchies and 
sustaining hierarchies within the international global order by doing so.  
 
Gammage is interested in whether the inclusion of gender is the next frontier. Is this another way 
to create and sustain hierarchies between countries. Now there is some discourse on feminist 
foreign policy. And this is outside of the context of FTAs but it's nevertheless important for 
grounding and understanding of what is being included in the external trade dimension of the EU’s 
action. The feminist foreign policy is grounded in liberal politics and feminist identities and 
neoliberal feminism. As a lot of literature from international relations shows us, that is an empty 
norm signifier which is meaningless. It is a form of branding or marketing for the state to ‘look really 
good’ internationally. Sweden was the first country to admit that it has this type of policy and other 
five countries stated that they are also adopting it. The language of women and girls can be a really 
useful tool for promoting certain agendas. If you read the 2030 Agenda from the United Nations, 
women and girls are talked about as ‘economic agents.’ They are not talked about as intrinsic 
value, but merely in terms of their participation in the economy. This seems to imply that trade is 
not gender neutral.  
 
Let us consider the recent evaluations of the EU’s FTA with Korea and Mexico and the three 
reviews going on with Colombia, Peru and GSP. Two other FTAs explicitly state within their 
evaluation reports that the effect of the FTA on gender and on poverty is neutral. There is no 
evidence to suggest that the FTA has created either anything positive or anything negative in 
promoting women and their participation in the economy. Internationally, the women's economic 
empowerment agenda has been in traction. At the WTO, for example, we have the economic 
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empowerment declaration, not binding but with 122 signatory states. There is also the international 
human rights framework of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. 
Earlier on, back in 1995, the ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’ came into existence. It is 
important to remember that they were signed decades ago. Within the Declaration, under para 
165(k), the members and the contracting parties have committed to seek to ensure that national 
policies related to international and regional trade agreements do not have an adverse impact on 
women's new and traditional economic activities. This should have been envisaged by a normative 
actor.  
 
Gammage looked at what she calls ‘internal and external hypocrisies’ – the way the EU operates 
internally and externally in a totally different way. Even with other aspects of the FTAs, as far as 
women and gender are concerned, there is hypocrisy within their approaches. Gender is included 
in FTAs elsewhere. This has started in Latin American countries and then Canada. Canada has 
already intimated that it may adopt feminist foreign policy and it has a strategy in place for this. But 
gender has been included within clauses or chapters elsewhere in the world. In Africa, the African 
regional economic communities have included gender plans since the 1980s and 90s – this is not 
a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, it can be an important branding or marketing tool. The African 
nations simply have not used this to market themselves in the same way that the EU or Canada 
are trying to do. Similarly, there is an interesting development post COVID-19 which Hawaii has 
set forth - a feminist economic recovery plan. It starts with the road to economic recovery it should 
not be ‘across women's backs.’  
 
Where the FTAs are contentious, they fail to address the complexities of both the formal and 
informal economies in which they are then being applied. This applies to the majority of women in 
the Global South. In South Korea, for example, about 70% of women are working in irregular 
employments in the informal economy. This raises the question as to what FTAs can actually do 
to create a better level playing field in terms of the industries that are working in the companies. 
What workers’ rights do they have? We see different approaches to FTAs and the chapters within 
them. In general, these clauses are not binding. Even if they are, in a chapter, they may reiterate 
the express commitment to follow internationally binding obligations. Yet, beyond that, it is about 
cooperation as seen in Canada, Latin America and the EU. This creates a problem for the EU if it 
is claiming to be this normative actor and a feminist or gender normative actor because there 
seems to be no real ‘teeth’ to the commitment to promoting women and gender sensitive trade 
policy.  
 
Within the sustainable development context, for example, there are domestic advisory groups 
which have not operated as they should have done. At the moment, it is expected that gender 
clauses will fall within this chapter. This raises the question how it is actually going to be 
enforceable. There are bigger issues relating to data management: how will data be collated in 
terms of FTA implementation to know whether the FTA is truly neutral in the way that the evaluation 
reports of Mexico and Korea say that they are? This is not just about the literal substantive meaning 
of the words in the text. It is about the institutional framework incorporated into FTAs. It is not just 
about bringing more women into trade negotiation – simply having women ‘on board’ does not 
necessarily mean that the result will be feminist policies. What is needed are inclusive and diverse 
institutional frameworks built into the FTA to ensure that there is proper management and collation 
of data to measure whether trade is gender sensitive and what the effects of the FTA are. Only 
then it will be possible to form gender responsive trade policies that can actually seek to remedy 
any wrongs that have been committed. 
 
 
8. The EU Deep Trade Agenda Stalled: The Case of Regulatory Disciplines in Services  
Billy Melo Araujo, Queen’s University Belfast 
 
Introduction 
This contribution examines the EU’s “deep trade agenda” as materialised in the area of trade in 
services. By exploring the EU’s FTA practice relating to horizontal and sector specific regulatory 
disciplines, the paper argues that despite presenting an opportunity to advance new international 
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rules, such FTAs have not in fact been used to innovate or develop new regulatory disciplines. On 
the contrary, these FTAs tend to merely consolidate support for existing international rules or 
standards. Its conclusion is that this approach, whilst presenting certain benefits, may also run the 
risk of promoting outdated regulatory frameworks. 
 
EU Deep Trade Agenda Stalled 
Melo Araujo discussed the promotion of positive integration in the area services and FTAs. He 
focused on substantive disciplines and standards that are typically included in the EU FTAs. This 
means any mechanism, any provision which would have the intention of having an immediate 
impact and effect on the substance on the content of domestic regulation, as opposed to process-
based standards. The rules which would focus on the manner in which domestic regulation has 
been applied: transparency, reasonable application of domestic measures, and even the 
regulatory cooperation mechanisms are an increasingly prominent feature of recent EU FTAs. The 
reason of focus on substantive standards, as he explains, goes back to a few years from now. The 
Global Europe Strategy, which is a very big policy framework, which also essentially started the 
whole process of negotiating the new ‘deep’ and comprehensive FTAs, is addressing the 
regulatory dimension of trade and services. Addressing regulatory barriers to trade and services 
was identified as of crucial importance, the key priority. Looking at the literature that was published 
by the Commission back then, it is possible to see the references to the terms such as ‘regulatory 
convergence’ in their services, the promotion of international standards and where possible, ‘EU 
standards’ in the services - so grand ambitions, outlined at a time. If one looks at the subsequent 
EU FTA practice since then, it seems fair to say that they have fallen somewhere short of those 
initial ambitions. In fact, the rise of regulatory cooperation mechanisms, for example is, in some 
ways, a reflection and acknowledgement of the limitations of this ‘deep’ trade agenda as it was 
initially formulated.  
 
The best way to understand what happens in EU FTA in terms of substantive standards and 
services is to look at the General Agreement on Trade and Services (the GATS) because the EU, 
as many trade powers, uses the regulatory framework of the GATS as a template, which then 
replicates into its own trading services chapters. Looking at the GATS, there are two main legal 
mechanisms which are intended to promote positive integration: horizontal disciplines on domestic 
regulation (art.6). Most of them are procedural in nature process- based standards, but there is 
para (4) which contains substantive disciplines, or a mandate to negotiate substantive disciplines, 
and sector specific disciplines. When it comes to art.6(4), there is a mandate for the WTO 
membership to develop substantive disciplines which apply to a subset of domestic regulatory 
measures relating to services. Measures which usually represent uptrend costs for service 
providers, for example qualification requirements and procedures, licencing requirements, 
technical standards, and a mandate to develop disciplined discipline which could preclude WTO 
members from adopting measures, which are more burdensome than necessary to ensure the 
quality of the surface. There is some sort of a necessity test, which of course would have to be 
fleshed out in WTO negotiations. The WTO members were able to negotiate necessity tests in the 
context of accountancy services sector, although those rules never entered into effect. The WTO 
membership has strived unsuccessfully over time to negotiate horizontal disciplines, with a number 
of reasons why these negotiations have not been successful. The most important one is that 
countries remain extremely reluctant to subject themselves to disciplines, which would undermine 
their regulatory autonomy in services which as you all know, characterised by extreme regulatory 
intensity and diversity. What do EU FTAs do with respect to these substantive sub standards 
envisaged in para (4)? Not much unless there is a rendez-vous clause where the countries agreed 
to revisit the issue once there is a successful conclusion to the WTO negotiation.  This is extremely 
unlikely in the short, medium or long term.  
 
In terms of the sector-specific disciplines there are a few minor disciplines at GATS level relating 
to financial services e.g. rules regulating monopoly rights. There is also an important one, which is 
the Reference Paper on telecommunications services, which is fairly unique in that it includes 
essentially a regulatory framework for the telecommunication services, a long list of regulatory 
principles, regulatory disciplines which are pro-competitive. The EU typically replicates the texts of 
these GATS instruments in its FTAs with a few deviations and some innovations. Broadly speaking, 
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it stays true to what's been negotiated at the GATS level. There are two trade agreements where 
the has agreed to include pro-competitive regulatory disciplines in other sectors - the EU-
CARIFORUM EPA where you have some competitive disciplines in the tourism sector. There is 
also EU-Central America Trade Agreement, where there are some very minor disciplines which 
apply to the courier and postal services sector. So really, in terms of substantive disciplines new 
FTS do very little they certainly don't affect the content substance of domestic regulation of EU’s 
FTA parties, partners, and they don't even reflect the applied the level of applied regulation in those 
countries in those jurisdictions.  
 
The question then is, whether the inability to achieve those initial grand objectives is the problem 
at all? Beyond the question of whether it was ever realistic to pursue positive integration, through 
substantive disciplines, we can say with some level of confidence that the idea of developing 
horizontal disciplines that would apply across all service sectors was always very unrealistic in the 
context of the bilateral trade agreement. This is especially so when you consider the struggles that 
the EU had in developing in the past and developing horizontal disciplines in the context of the 
internal market. Beyond the question of whether it was a realistic, there is also the question whether 
it was desirable to pursue that type of positive integration. We have a significant body of political 
economy literature which clearly shows that pursuing positive integration along the lines of broad 
regulatory principles can be very problematic, especially when the developing countries are asked 
to implement them. They may have different levels of economic development, different social 
historical preferences and so forth. Potentially, this inability to pursue this ‘deep’ trade agenda in 
this way is a positive development.  
 
Missed Opportunities? 
Interestingly, the EU never sought to use of the FTAs as an opportunity to develop the necessity 
tests. The types of passage envisaged in art.6(4) for the GATS on a sectoral basis rather than 
horizontal basis by identifying countries which are like-minded and where there is already a certain 
level of regulatory convergence. For example, Canada with CETA, the telecommunications 
services sector and applying necessity tests in that particular context, where the emphasis would 
be not on creating common regulatory frameworks, but rather just setting aside burdensome or 
trade -restrictive regulation. And if, hypothetically, a country were to leave the EU, and already 
have the acquis communatutaire fully integrated in its domestic system, a trade negotiation with 
said country might present the perfect opportunity to develop such disciplines. 
 
 
Session 2. The EU, Global Data Flows and Challenges ahead 
 
1. The EU as a Global Data Actor in the COVID Era  
Christopher Kuner, VUB Brussels 
 
Introduction 
In recent years the EU has launched many legal data protection initiatives, which have also 
influenced data protection law and policy around the world and have been motivated by the 
protection of fundamental rights, the globalization of the economy, and the desire to project the 
EU’s values and interests externally. These initiatives have been realised through the anchoring 
of data-related values in EU constitutional instruments; the enactment of secondary legislation; 
and important judgments of the Court of Justice. However, the EU has tended to prioritise the 
assertion of its own values and interests at the expense of those of international law and of third 
countries. Its approach to data protection raises a number of important questions about the 
influence of EU law outside EU borders, which have become even more pressing in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
Kuner discussed data protection and data protection rights more globally. Over the last few 
decades the EU has been involved in a project to spread its vision of data protection and data 
protection rights globally. This means not just data protection but fundamental rights in general. As 
the CJEU has emphasised, the Charter on Fundamental Rights is the basis for data protection 
which has implications on fundamental rights in general. This initiative has been based on both the 
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values and the interests of the EU. One of the main manifestations of this phenomenon has been 
the global influence of the GDPR as the kind of centrepiece of the EU’s framework for data 
protection. In this regard the EU has certainly been on a ‘civilising mission.’ Commissioner Věra 
Jourová have said the GDPR is “our reference point at the global level on privacy.” There are 
further quotes from the past Commissioner Reding who had said that “the GDPR is the gold 
standard for the world.” The former rapporteur for the European Parliament Jan-Philipp Albrecht 
even said the GDPR will change “nothing less than the whole world as we know it”. The question 
is, has the effect of the EU’s global activities and data protection been benign and has it been 
effective? The answer would probably be a mix of successes and failures. Certainly, the GDPR 
has had a huge global influence, for example in Asia, countries like Japan, China, South Korea.  
There is a significant interplay between the legal factors and the political factors. Second point for 
the discussion was COVID-19. COVID-19 does present some new challenges to the global 
influence of EU data protection law. Data gathering and data transfers have become viewed as 
central to combating COVID-19. Thus, Israel and South Korea have had success using a lot of 
data collection to fight the pandemic. There has been a lot of criticism of the GDPR by various 
countries saying that it is hindering the fight against COVID-19 and collection of data. Kuner does 
not share this criticism – in his view, the GDPR is flexible enough. At the same time, there has 
clearly been an uptake in the questioning of whether EU data protection laws are too strict and if 
this has the potential to undermine some of the GDPR’s global influence. For instance, some of 
those from Asian countries or the APEC principles, may be found more appropriate to allow the 
collection of data to combat a pandemic than the GDPR. While it might not be necessarily true, 
there is the potential for it to happen.  
The third point discussed the balance between EU fundamental rights and Member State 
fundamental rights which is seemingly changing and may also affect this area as well. In the last 
decade the EU has focused largely on strengthening the fundamental right of data protection at 
the EU level through judgments. However, there are some recent developments which give rise to 
speculation that the EU fundamental rights may be at risk of being weakened by Member State 
fundamental rights. This can be seen in the judgments of the CJEU and in some Member State 
judgments. The CJEU seems to be stepping back from exerting EU rights to data protection too 
far in a territorial sense. This may be seen, for example, in the Google case12 where the court 
found that there is no obligation under EU data protection law for Google to extend the so-called 
‘right to be forgotten’ globally. Advocate General Szpunar, in his previous opinion, made the 
statement that EU law applies “only extraterritorially in extreme situations of an exceptional nature.” 
Kuner finds this a little too restrictive as Szpunar has not explained how he reached that conclusion. 
What can be seen, however, is that the Court stepping back a little bit from ‘not wanting’ to push 
the territorial scope of EU data protection law too far.  
The upcoming Schrems II judgement may also apply to this issue. This may be contrasted with the 
judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) of 19 May 2020 
finding that constitutional limitations on German state power are bound by German constitution 
even outside of Germany, even with regard to foreigners. This was quite a remarkable conclusion. 
This raises the questions of whether the EU fundamental rights will become more limited in a 
territorial sense, and whether Member State fundamental rights or Member State constitutional 
courts will try to ‘pick up the slack’ in that regard? What does this mean for the already delicate 
balance between EU and Member State fundamental rights? 
 
2. Reconciling data privacy and global data flows the EU way 
Svetlana Yakovleva, University of Amsterdam 
 
Introduction 
In 2018 the European Commission published model clauses on cross-border data flows and the 
                                               
12 C-507/17Google LLC, Successor in Law to Google Inc. v Commission Nationale de l'informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) 
Request for a Preliminary Ruling from the Conseil d'État ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 
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protection of data privacy, which have been included in the EU's proposals for digital trade chapters 
ever since. In the recent European data strategy, the new European Commission pledged to 
continue addressing “unjustified obstacles to data flows in bilateral discussions and international 
fora … while promoting and protecting European data processing rules and standards.” It follows 
that the approach taken in the model clauses still holds. Yakovleva’s presentation provided a 
critical assessment of the EU's model clauses and evaluated whether the proposed language is 
effective in reconciling data privacy and global data flows. She then examined possible better 
alternative ways of achieving the same result. Yakovleva also reflected on the idea that the EU's 
trade policy on global data flows is not only focused on safeguarding domestic autonomy to protect 
data privacy as a fundamental right, but also on protecting the particular design of the regulatory 
framework for data flows embedded in the General Data Protection Regulation. This framework 
itself, however, suffers from several deficiencies, improving which could make the protection of the 
fundamental right to data privacy more effective and would be more conducive to global data flows.  
 
External Digital Trade Discourse and Internal Fundamental Rights Discourse 
Yakovleva talked about the EU’s trade policy on cross-border data flows and how privacy and data 
protection fit in that policy. She outlined two core discourses that happen on EU level. The first one 
is an external digital trade discourse and the second one is more inward-looking fundamental rights 
discourse. The discussion about cross-border data flows and data protection often depends on the 
venue. It could sound either ‘offensive’ in the sense that that EU wants to expand digital trade and 
wants to facilitate cross-border data flows because of their value for digital trade. On the other 
hand, the same discussion could happen from a different perspective: that digital trade threatens 
fundamental rights to data protection and privacy and that the EU has to protect its values from 
digital trade. In fact, in the recent European Strategy for Data,13 these two discourses co-exist. The 
EU has been very active in the last two years, including in provisions on cross-border data flows 
and the protection of personal data in its trade agreements. This also includes the negotiations on 
e-commerce among 80 WTO Member States and the negotiations with the UK.  
 
The EU’s Contorted Negotiation Position on Data Flows 
How does this translate into the EU trade strategy and trade policy on data flows? First of all, the 
EU position is based on the model clauses published in 2018. It contains three articles: article A 
concerns with a prohibition of data localization measures. It contains an exhaustive list of measures 
that are prohibited by a trade agreement. This approach contrasts with a competing model that is 
adopted in already existing US- led trade agreements. Namely, that those agreements just contain 
an open prohibition of restrictions on cross-border data flows. In contrast, the above-mentioned 
article A of the model clauses outlines specifically which particular restrictions are banned.  
 
The more relevant, however, is article B on safeguarding the EU’s domestic autonomy to regulate 
the protection of privacy and personal data as fundamental rights and, in particular, to limit 
transfers of personal data outside the European Economic Area for that purpose. In contrast to the 
US model, neither the existing EU trade agreements nor the proposed model clauses regulate data 
protection or privacy directly; they do not contain an article that outlines certain principles of data 
protection that Parties to a trade agreement agreed to implement. Article B also provides that 
protection of personal data and privacy is a fundamental right. This is clearly a very EU-centric 
approach. Even though many countries have adopted a similar framework to the EU data 
protection framework, not all of them recognised this normative rationale for protecting privacy and 
personal data. The core of article B, however, is an exception for domestic rules on privacy and 
data protection, which sets the limits within which each party can restrict data flows in their 
domestic regulation. The main goal from the EU perspective is to ensure that the restrictions on 
transfers of personal data codified in Chapter V of the GDPR are not undermined and cannot be 
successfully challenged in international trade fora. The EU is channelling negotiations with its 
trading partners on transfers of personal data through the GDPR rather than through trade 
agreements. By doing so, the EU is trying to export its data protection framework as the “golden 
standard” of data protection: a phenomenon labelled by Anu Bradford as the “Brussels effect”.14 
This provision also explicitly allows the Parties to adopt restrictions on cross-border data flows. 
                                               
13 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/building-european-data-economy  
14 Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels Effect’ (2012) 107 Northwestern University Law Review 1  
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The scope of the exception is very broad: the threshold at the heart of it is modelled after the “it 
considers necessary” test of the national security exception in existing trade agreements. In 
essence, it allows any party to restrict cross-border data flows if this party deems such restrictions 
appropriate for the protection of privacy and personal data. What this means in practice is that 
mere plausibility that these measures can contribute to the protection of privacy and personal data 
are sufficient. The breadth of this exception raises the question of how effective article A would be, 
on prohibiting data localisation if each member can restrict data flows on the grounds even vaguely 
related to the protection of privacy and personal data.  
 
The third article, article X, prohibits regulatory cooperation on digital trade – which is a U-turn from 
the previous EU approach as in several recent trade agreements (e.g. with Singapore, Canada 
(CETA), and South Korea). E-commerce chapters of these agreements contain explicit provisions, 
encouraging parties to conduct regulatory cooperation on e-commerce issues, including data 
protection and privacy. Privacy and data protection, from the EU perspective, are not to be 
negotiated or discussed at all in the trade fora.  
 
Critical Assessment 
There are several weaknesses in the GDPR especially in Chapter V, which are not very effective 
in protecting fundamental rights in the EU and which actually do not allow, in the light of they are 
currently implemented and enforced, to maintain the high level of fundamental rights protection. 
The GDPR is a positive development, in the sense of protecting privacy and personal data 
domestically, however, the EU could also explore the possibilities for adjusting: to increase their 
effectiveness in preventing the circumvention of high level of privacy and personal data protection 
in the EU by transferring personal data to so-called “data heavens,” but also to make these rules 
more conductive for international trade.  
 
The model clauses recognise that data protection and privacy are fundamental rights. The 
possibility to maintain this normative rationale in its domestic framework is important for the EU 
because fundamental rights protection leads to a higher level of protection than the level warranted 
on economic grounds. However, that provision could be framed in more flexible way, that is 
allowing on the one hand, the EU to maintain the high level of protection, and, on the other hand, 
allowing other parties to use other justifications for protection of privacy and personal data in their 
domestic frameworks, based on their legal and cultural traditions.  
 
Using an extremely low threshold for domestic measures inconsistent with trade rules from the 
national security exception as a model for a privacy and data protection exception could be 
dangerous because this would create a precedent for other public policy objectives to replicate this 
low threshold. If this exception eventually becomes the norm for multiple public policy objectives, 
it would be questionable how much would be left of trade liberalisation commitments. And finally, 
by creating a specific exception for privacy and data protection in digital trade context, the EU 
strategy implicitly raises these policy objectives higher than others, such as public health, safety 
or environment. These other public policy objectives still fall under a different – general exception 
– with a much higher threshold. It is also important to focus on how these policy objectives relate 
to other fundamental rights protected in the EU and whether it is justifiable to rank privacy and data 
protection higher than other objectives.  
 
 
3. Trade in non-personal data and e-commerce: The EU’s push for a global zone of 
free data flow?  
Andrea Ott & Anke Moerland, University of Maastricht 
 
Introduction  
The regulation or non-regulation of cross-border data flows is mainly perceived through the lens of 
data protection. This paper, however, focuses on the flow of non-personal data. The need for 
‘quality non-personal data’ for training, research and development is increasing for all businesses 
and institutions. That means data must be structured and bias-free. In particular, big data analytics, 
relevant for almost all economic activities, relies on huge amounts of quality data, also from abroad. 
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Consequently, the EU perceives the free flow of non-personal data as a prerequisite for the Digital 
Single Market. To that end, it has adopted a Regulation (the EU Non-personal data regulation, 
NPDR) to remove obstacles across Member States and IT systems in Europe. As a first step, data 
localisation requirements on the storing or processing of non-personal data have been limited. 
Together with the rules on personal data (GDPR), the EU is exporting its rules on trade in non-
personal data (NPDR) through the WTO framework as well as bilateral and regional trade 
agreements in order to advance the EU market for non-personal data and create a zone of free 
data flow with other countries.  
 
In their contribution, Andrea Ott and Anke Moerland focus on the rules relevant for the regulation 
of trade in non-personal data and analyse how the EU is pushing the exportation of its own rules 
and the development of new rules at the global level. They map and frame the different activities 
and players involved in the trade in nonpersonal data, while at the same time being mindful of 
situations where personal and non-personal data may be intertwined. This paper aims to pay 
special attention to the commercial activities particularly relevant to the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution, characterised by digital trade generally, and more specifically cloud computing, data 
processing services and computer and ICT services. The paper then proceeds to provide an 
overview in how far the new Regulation and other applicable EU Regulations (E-commerce, Digital 
Single Market) reduce restrictions in e-commerce, investment restrictions in digital sectors, data 
localization restrictions or intermediate liability measures that restrict the operations of platforms. 
The mapping of the existing EU regulatory approach determines the EU’s external approach 
toward free flow of non-personal data. While bilateral agreements do not yet set out detailed rules 
regarding most of these matters and only touch upon data protection in a cursory fashion, the 
paper also analyses other initiatives that the EU is already undertaking, with the aim of developing 
a global zone of free data flow.  
 
The May 2019 proposal by the EU on e-commerce rules at the WTO establishes net neutrality, 
free data flows and basic consumer protection. At the same time, it creates exceptions to limit the 
free flow of data to guarantee privacy. This initiative, however, has not received the support by 
important players such as the US. They support free flow of data for the benefit of cross-border e-
commerce and digital business but push back EU’s privacy concerns. Japan, on the other hand, 
is working towards a commitment to create a so-called data free-flow with trust and hence may be 
a strong ally regarding the safeguarding of privacy. Ott and Moerland analysed the norms that are 
likely to derive from such cooperation efforts, and how these will interact with 1) the current EU 
rules on trade in non-personal data and 2) rules of other countries, such as the US. 
 
Research Questions and Framework for Assessment 
Ott and Moerland focused on the non-personal data and e-commerce that use push for a global 
zone of free trade through free data flow. They asked two research questions: first of all, does the 
internal regulatory framework on non-personal data impact the external dimension? The EU set 
up certain ‘golden standards,’ which have also been reflected in EU trade negotiations and creates 
future active FTA or current FTA. Secondly, do the EU rules, facilitate or impede trade in non-
personal data? Maybe there are conflicting interests or conflicting values, which stand each in each 
other’s way. The framework Ott and Moerland relied upon is based on rules regarding trade in non-
personal data (NPDR); rules regarding liability of online service providers for copyright-infringing 
content.  
 
The rules regarding liability of online service providers for copyright infringing content could be 
very restrictive. Here the EU seems to contradict its action – there are some issues which could 
be difficult to reconcile.  
 
Personal v. Non-Personal Data 
There are different frameworks when we talk about personal data versus non-personal data and 
mixed datasets. Personal data is any kind of data that refers to an actual person. It can identify a 
person directly or indirectly, such as names or identity, identification numbers, localisation data 
and other types of information. Non-personal data, on the other hand, is defined a contrario – 
everything that is not personal is non-personal. That may also be the data which originally did not 
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relate to an identifiable subject, i.e. weather conditions. At the same time, it could also be such 
data that did refer to specific personal data but has been anonymised. In the majority of cases we 
see mixed datasets, where personal data is combined with non-personal data making it the non-
personal data regulation. The preference from the EU for the GDPR regulation may be seen.  
 
Internal Rules Facilitating Data Flows 
The starting point on the internal rules facilitating data flows is the novel regulation which came 
into force in May 2019.15 There already was a prohibition of data localisation found in this novel 
regulation. It allowed companies and public administration, however, to store non-personal data 
wherever they choose it. There is a restriction regarding justifications on public security grounds. 
What is already highlighted as discussable exception, is how far it restricts, or how far it is actually 
limited. However, this kind of security exception has to comply with a principle of proportionality. 
Public authorities retain access to data, even if it is later collected in another Member States or 
stored in the cloud. Importantly, it encourages self-regulation by providers to develop codes of 
conducts, enabling users to pour data between cloud services. It provides data availability for 
competent authorities and the portability of data.  
 
This is lined back to the external dimension and raises the question as to whether EU also extends 
this kind of fifth fundamental right regarding the single internal market and the digital internal 
market also needs in external spheres. Is there anything parallel happening as we see for data 
protection rights? There are some aspects and there is a whole chapter EU proposal on the current 
FTA negotiations with certain countries where they involve this kind of cross-border data flow (art.1 
and art.2 address the data protection aspects). However, is this kind of an annex to data protection 
not a self-standing aspect? How far is the impact of this on the actual negotiations? The current 
state of play and the evolution of the norms in regard to the free flow of data, non-personal data is 
already being looked at. There is a set of developments that the EU tries to harmonise, its internal 
dimension with the external dimension. It is also trying to address the external FTAs.  
 
State of Play and Evolution of Norms (FTAs and Negotiations) 
The beginning is rather ‘modest’ if one looks at the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. 
There is only reference to the future discussions of the inclusion of positions on the free flow of 
data into the agreements. This is also repeated in the EU-Mexico Global Agreements where there 
is a finalised text and principle that has the same clause as the Japanese economic agreement. 
There are also some traces of non-data aspects being imprecise providing not yet finalised 
negotiations with third countries like the FTA with Indonesia. There is a new proposal in this regard 
on the table. The FTA with Australia, and also the modernised association agreement with Chile. 
These are the proposals where there is a digital trade chapter and where also the free flow of data 
is covered. Again, it has to be seen whether the partner countries will accept this.  
 
Rules Impeding the Data Flows 
The question is raised again, whether the EU is a global actor in terms of data flow? Looking at 
the rules, other than in the non-personal data regulation, namely the new director for the Digital 
Single Market (DSM) - a new liability regime has been implemented within the EU for service 
providers. They are sharing copyright protected content, so all sorts of information that is shared 
and these types of full liability that now has been established. This means that service providers 
cannot just rely on right holders to inform them when they find copyright infringing content on their 
platform. They are fully primary liable from the beginning for sharing content that is copyright 
protected. They can rely on an exception here, so liability would be pre- accepted, when they 
receive an authorisation from the right holders, when they are filtering through the works by trying 
to identify which are the infringing content, and when they act speedy once the right holder informs 
them. This is new, since before there was the rule under the e-commerce directive where liability 
is a secondary. That meant that service providers will not be liable for any infringing IP content 
when they act expeditiously once they are notified of infringing content, and they play a neutral, 
merely technical and passive role. This was the rule before the DSM directive.  
 
                                               
15 Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free 
flow of non-personal data in the European Union, OJ L 303 (28.11.2018). 
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Looking at the external side, there are no such rules in free trade agreements. It is interesting to 
see the developments of the future FTA where such a rule may be included. This can be seen, for 
example in the EU-Indonesia Agreement proposal, (which is one of the recent) the old liability 
regime is included. There is secondary liability. But it will be a different approach and what will that 
mean for sharing data on service providers. 
 
 
4. The Geoeconomics of the Data-Trade Nexus the Geoeconomics of the Data-Trade 
Nexus 
Tobias Gehrke, Egmont Institute/University of Ghent 
 
Introduction 
Data is a crucial input in the development of emerging technologies which blur the lines between 
civil and military application (e.g., AI). A growing number of states seem to determine that a 
technological advantage – much of which may be dependent on data – can alter the balance of 
power and security competition in the international order. The unilateral regulation of data, for 
example by restricting its uninhibited flow across borders, is therefore increasingly linked to the 
pursuit of ‘security’ objectives – particularly in China and India. An expanding notion of ‘security’, 
which bridges economic security and national security concerns, pose major challenges to trade 
governance. In the absence of definitive established multilateral rules on data and trade and the 
return of great power competition, different ‘models’ of data regulation (China-vs-US-vs-EU) are 
competing for regulatory spheres of influence. Is a multilateral compromise reconcilable at all? 
How much discretion should trade policy (multilateral, bilateral) grant states over their data 
regulation activity? How do we reconcile the trade-security nexus when the ‘security state’ is on 
the rise? How can we find trade rules which allow to preserve most of the benefits of data trade, 
while being realistic about the nature of today’s security and power competition? These are just a 
few questions of importance for lawyers and political scientists alike. As this seminar is going to 
explore the global role of the EU in trade and data privacy, this contribution would seek to broaden 
the discussion on the data-trade nexus beyond privacy. As recent initiatives, including the 
European Digital Strategy, the EU 5G Toolbox, the EU Industrial Strategy, or the European Cloud 
Initiative indicate, the EU is increasingly willing to more actively manage technological 
interdependencies for ‘security’ purposes. This more integrated understanding could help us 
address questions of EU actorness in the data-trade realm in the coming years.  
 
Techno-Nationalism: a Geoeconomic Challenge 
Gehrke discussed the geoeconomic challenge to data trade and the concept of techno-nationalism. 
A technology edge over competitors in international system is directly linked to national security, 
economic prosperity, and social stability. There is a competition over technology among states, 
especially the United States and China but also increasingly in most other states. As a response 
the states seek more interventionist tools to intervene into tech markets and particularly with 
economic regulatory instruments to either: a) protect against opportunistic or hostile foreign actors 
(for instance there is a lot of developments and debate on investment screening or export controls 
in OECD countries) or b) to promote national tech development and innovation at home (for 
instance, industrial policy or to promote the adoption of technologies, standards or national tech 
standards abroad – e.g. for the Digital Silk Road). The innovating, shaping and controlling 
technology is really one of the key aspects of great power competition today. Some would call the 
policies that are being adopted as ‘neo- mercantilist,’ though Gehrke argued that this frame is too 
narrow to classify policies, as it does not elude to the security motivations which drive economic 
policy.  
 
It is observed that the constituents that argue for more interventionist policies are gaining ground. 
The question is, whether data is captured by this logic. Restrictions to data flows are proliferating 
globally for decades. Already, e.g. in China and India as well as other emerging economies, more 
and more data flow restrictions can be seen. In the literature, the question is asked as to why do 
states restrict data. Often, the policy motivations are categorised along neat dividing lines, e.g. 
protectionism, cyber security, law enforcement and the ominous national security category. One 
of the key challenges of the emerging tech nationalist logic is that it significantly blurs the lines 
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between economic and security motivations behind restrictive interventions into data flows. This 
co-existence of motivations to intervene and/or restrict data (and other economic) flows is thus 
best captured by adopting a broader frame: geoeconomic competition.  
 
Data is the main input into machine learning and artificial intelligence, which the strategic 
technology fits perfectly into the geoeconomic logic because its adoption has immense spill over 
effects not only in the commercial economic sphere, but also in the military sphere. We observe a 
gradual manifestation of the logic that being able to scale technology innovation and adoption as 
a result of a data advantage may provide an edge over other powers in the global geoeconomic 
competition. The clearest example of this logic manifestation is China. A study by Henrique Moraes 
of KU Leuven showed how data localization policy in China is framed along this logic in the past 
couple of years. In its domestic law and policy, data (both personal and important data – two 
categories which are highly ambivalent in scope) is framed as a strategic variable that is supporting 
China’s grand strategy ambitions of technological autonomy and influence, as laid out in various 
documents. It is important for researchers and policymakers to understand this international angle 
to Chinese data flow restrictions and not only consider them as a protectionist domestic trade 
barrier. The geoeconomic challenge, Gehrke argued, is turning this technical issue into one of 
geopolitical relevance. This observation might bring different insights into how we seek to regulate 
data flows globally.  
 
EU Data: From Privacy to Sovereignty 
EU data flow restrictions, to date, have focused primarily on privacy issues – as regulated strictly 
by the GDPR. For all other non-personal data flows, the EU has reiterated across various strategy 
papers and communications its commitment to ensure unrestricted global flows. Especially within 
the single market, EU regulatory reform proposals seek to combat restrictions with the aim of 
advancing a digital single market as a motor for growth.  
 
However, beyond the single market, a call for ‘sovereignty’ (dig ital/data/technology) has recently 
entered European discourse. At this point, different narratives over what sovereignty of data 
implies in practice are still contesting. Different constituencies argue over culture, control, 
competitiveness or security. In the view of Gehrke, this debate shows that the EU is not exempt 
from the emerging geoeconomic logic which is capturing data and technology regulation more 
generally. What kind of regulatory requirements the EU might adopt for third countries to access 
the non-personal data of the single market remains undecided. Experiences we have made in 
recent market access regulations in Europe (and other OECD countries) suggest, however, that 
factors of economic security and national security (broadly captured by the emerging European 
concept of ‘sovereignty’) will play an increasing role in the policy deliberation. This merging of 
economic and technical regulation with a geoeconomic logic is thus a crucial factor for the future 
of EU data studies.  
 
Some might argue that this is just ‘charades’ of policymakers, to really disguise the classic 
protectionism as industrial sectors. While this might be true at times, as security arguments always 
offer a protective shelter for protection-seeking lobbies, Gehrke argued it would be dangerous not 
to engage more thoroughly with the geoeconomic logic which is fuelling these perceived security 
vulnerabilities. This is particularly true for international trade regulation. There is a new wave of 
legal scholarship, for example, looking into national security exceptions in multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements, which consider to what degree these exceptions might be up-to-date to the new 
geoeconomic logic of state competition. Gehrke argued that the debate in the trade law field, which 
concerns the scope of data flow rules (e.g. exemption to trade under what conditions?), must be 
more open to engage with the IPE and political science scholarship, which offers growing insights 
into the geoeconomic competition on which international economic affairs are built. For the 
research community, therefore, more inter-disciplinary research will seek to address big questions 
of international economic order and its rules and norms anew. Which economic/technology sectors 
will allow us to further integrate globally without infringing on the growing security interests of 
states? Should we focus rather on bilateral or plurilateral integration among like-minded countries 
to avoid the growing conflict of the national security state with trade law?  
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5. Geopolitics, multilateralism and the coronavirus pandemic 
Henry Farrell, George Washington University and Abraham Newman, Georgetown 
University 
 
Introduction 
Before she took office, Ursula von der Leyen was already insisting that the European Union (EU) 
needed to change. On the one hand, she promised a new “geopolitical Commission,” but on the 
other, she wanted the EU “to be the guardian of multilateralism.” The difficult question was left 
unstated: How exactly is the EU supposed to reconcile the great power manoeuvring of geopolitics 
with the more level playing pitch of multilateralism? Geopolitics is the ruthless pursuit of self-
interest by powerful states, no matter the cost to others. Multilateralism involves mutual 
agreements among states, pursuing their collective welfare. At a minimum, the two sit awkwardly 
with each other; at the worst, they are radically incompatible. In their presentation, Farrell and 
Newman examined how these two imperatives are coming into conflict because of the coronavirus 
pandemic. Both internally and externally, the EU faces difficult trade-offs between multilateral 
solidarity and national self-interest. They argued that the EU needs to understand how to use 
challenges such as coronavirus to become the basis for a new means of reconciling internal and 
external demands in similar ways to how the "four freedoms" of open exchange and the global 
multilateral trading system provided mutually supporting structures in a previous era. 
 
Farrell and Newman situated the conversation about the EU as a global actor in the broader 
international context. The literature on the EU as a global actor starts from the idea of the EU's 
resources. It asks whether it has a big market? Does it have institutions? What are its internal 
capabilities? Although these are important questions, they do not mean much if the EU is not 
situated in a larger international context. The second talking point was about the new strategic 
environment that the EU is facing right now. The question here is what does the EU do in terms of 
internal reform to meet this new geostrategic environment? If the EU’s ability to be a global actor 
depends on the context in which it finds itself, and that context is changing, there is a need to think 
about that context.  
 
The EU in a new geostrategic environment 
Farrell and Newman elaborated on three points about the new geostrategic environment. First of 
all, globalisation is generating new vulnerabilities for states. This is seen in ‘stark relief’ in the wake 
of the coronavirus. The first one is the drive towards efficiency. As globalisation and economic 
exchange increased the demand by firms to create efficiency, then what is tending in some sectors 
to happen is that firms become so specialised in the supply chain networks that they create these 
kinds of choke points within those supply chain. An example is the PPE or ventilator production, 
where just a few firms in Germany control a disproportionate amount of the market. That is 
something that was not supposed to happen. That was not Thomas Friedman's version of 
globalisation. Also, it is not the version of globalisation that the EU functions on. The whole idea 
behind the internal market and the external policy is a very liberalisation-focused agenda, in which 
free trade is supposed to reduce conflict. It is supposed to prevent these types of choke points. 
Instead, globalisation, first through this channel of efficiency-drive really leads to specialisation, 
extreme specialisation. It is so specialised that it ‘bites’ people in the end because they become 
so dependent on a few firms that have this very specialised production profile.  
 
The second vulnerability that globalisation generates is irreplaceability. A few firms have the 
incentive to make themselves so important to a sector that people have to use them. It is only 
necessary to look through the main information technology companies – Google, Facebook, 
Amazon – to see that this is a different dynamic. This is not so much about efficiency, but about 
agglomeration. They become monopoly, duopoly players in these markets so that it is impossible 
to conduct global economic exchange without going through a few of these firms. These two 
processes of efficiency and irreplaceability mean that globalisation is not a story of simple a flat 
decentralised world where states become neutered by firms that are across the globe. But in fact, 
everybody is being channelled through these few choke points that globalisation is creating.  
 
29 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
2020/04 
  
The economic-security linkage 
Those vulnerabilities that globalisation is creating are increasing weight to security issues. It is not 
just about Amazon using market power for their own abilities, but states realise this structural 
transformation. They are using those to get their own geostrategic ends. This is what Farrell and 
Newman labelled as “weaponized interdependence.” In the new context, in data flows, this is seen 
in the Schrems16 decision where the court questioned what Snowden was telling. Snowden is 
telling us is that data flows are not just about trade relations, they are about security relations. This 
is the crux of the Schrems decision and then the conflict over the privacy shield. Those linkages 
between the economic realm and the security realm really create a new challenge for the EU as a 
global actor. Traditionally, its internal institutions have been separated, e.g. DG trade etc. They are 
not integrated with this larger security conversation.  
 
The EU and the ‘bicycle theory’ 
There is a standard argument of European integration which says that it is the ‘bicycle theory.’ The 
European integration needs to keep on moving forward, or else it stops. This is somewhat a penny 
farthing period of integration in the middle. Looking at XIX century bicycles, there are one really 
small wheel with a big wheel. It is the external environment that the EU finds itself in. On the small 
wheel, there are the tools that it uses to build its own internal market, its own internal way of doing 
things. The EU is able to move forward, but those two wheels are connected together by some 
kind of a gear train, and they are moving in the same direction and affect those two wheels. If they 
start moving in different directions, things start fall apart for the EU.  
 
This is the current situation where we see Ursula Van der Leyen. The impression is that neither 
her, nor anyone else realise what that means in practice. In practice, if the EU could find itself in a 
‘tricky’ world, it is because it is used to a world in which its internal market, processes, the four 
freedoms, the single market, all of those went hand in hand with a broader globalisation based on 
open free markets. We are in the world where the outside environment is not about free markets. 
Instead, it is about geopolitical manoeuvring, in which both China and the United States are much 
more ruthless in their willingness to use power protection than they have been in the past.  
 
Dilemmas facing the EU 
And this presents the EU with some real dilemmas. It cannot behave in the same way as the United 
States or China without endangering its own internal logic. If it starts to really engage in intense 
power projection externally, that creates all of these internal questions as well. This brings to a 
point about how the European Commission is going to get more ‘knacks’ on national champions 
because it needs to build up European alternatives. That is going to lead to some tricky internal 
debate about whether it is Germany's or France’s national champions which prevail. It is going to 
create a number of blockages that are going to be tricky, and we also see how this is applied in 
the first phase of coronavirus. The EU has taken these short-term internal steps, when various 
Member States looked to hoard PPE and ventilators, and that pretty quickly gave way to the EU 
trying to get rid of those internal controls, but also trying to put blockages on terminal exports. This 
is a really difficult position for the EU to be in for it is trying to do fundamentally different things 
inside and outside. This does not work particularly well over the longer term.  
 
The need for political transformations  
The EU is not going to succeed at becoming a truly powerful geopolitical actor in the way that it 
would like to be without some profound and unlikely political transformations. If it wants, for 
example, to be able to challenge United States financial hegemony, it would have to come up with 
all of these fiscal capacities for the European Central Bank, with the ability of the European Central 
Bank to extend swap lines, not only to European actors, but to other actors as well. However, there 
are areas where the EU could plausibly work to project external power in ways that reinforce rather 
than in undermine its internal logic. Some of these have to do with the problem of climate change. 
For example, the way in which various proposals for border taxes might plausibly reinforce an 
internal imperative towards a reform which tries to push towards a more EU-focused on more 
strong institutions on the EU level for dealing with climate change. Data flows are an additional 
                                               
16 Case C-498/16 Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited 2018 ECLI:EU:C:2018:37. 
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issue. The Commission is trying to put together antitrust, citizen protection and data protection all 
under one basket.  
 
Looking at coronavirus, one can see a much stronger European Union. When it comes to various 
health capacities, we cannot afford to have ‘every member state doing its own thing’ The EU 
member states have been pushing for common patent pools, and other such arrangements to help 
further with the process of developing vaccines for coronavirus. That is going to project geopolitical 
force. It has to do so in ways that reinforce and strengthen its own internal ways of working and 
vice versa. 
 
 
6. The EU as a “Good” Global Actor: Keynote Remarks  
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, University of Oxford 
 
Nicolaïdis offered some normative reflections across the topics covered by the conference around 
the theme of legitimate extraterritoriality. She asked under what condition it may be legitimate for 
the EU to export rules, laws and norms to third countries. Nicolaïdis raised the following questions: 
what is it about the EU itself that makes it more or less legitimate? What are the limits of the idea 
of EU as a (legal) model and power through trade? And how, or to what extent, have and will the 
Brexit negotiations affect this debate? She discussed in particular three trade-offs: between power 
and technical logics, between unilateral externalisation and multilateralization, and between 
deference and interference. The examples she provided covered labour rights, finance, 
professions, human rights, data, cyber and the environment. 
 
Nicolaïdis started with three framing points and three paradigms for actors. Before framing the first 
framing point, one has to think about the deep drivers of change in this story. One way of asking 
that question is to ask “are we moving from a ‘session-one’ world, to a ‘session-two’ world? Are 
these parallel universes?” This links to Gehrke, Farrell and Newman’s arguments on techno-
nationalism, the kind of strategic autonomy that is becoming the core narrative in the pandemic 
discourse. The question is, what are the tensions in Europe in existing? And the bigger question 
is, should this all be about some sort of autonomous regulatory orbit for the EU between China 
and the US? Are we shrinking it or enlarging it? We are in between those two worlds. What matters 
is how these two logics interact, as argued by Gehrke: what is the field that must be levelled by 
our rules? Is the position of trade just a distraction, telling other countries what to do? Should EU 
care about that? Or is the logic of the public versus private as locus of power more important? For 
instance, Apple and Google are now taking over even the British government for the tracing app, 
etc. But the question is, what exactly does the crisis tell us about the steady state, will there even 
be a steady state? There are real risks that are associated with globalised forms of emergency 
politics, but also political opportunities. One can note the re-rise of a corporative logic. Ignacio 
Garcia Bercero asked a question on WTO reform and the role that the EU can again play leading 
on issues of trade in health and a humanity spirit. There is this question of this moment, of the 
session-one and session-two worlds.  
 
The second framing question concerns the problematisation of this relationship between the 
analytical and the normative. The bigger picture differentiates between the strong/weak question 
of power and the normative: is it good or bad? How can it be good? The EU can be weak and good 
– this is power of being super powerless. Conversely, being strong can be bad. This is linked to 
Mancini’s discussion on how the EU can be a great rule-maker in the trade and rights agendas. 
Global governance is made up of global organisations that ‘have teeth with no soul’ and then those 
who ‘have a soul with no teeth.’ Each may be put their own these categories. The EU at its best 
wants to facilitate the linking of the two putting trade teeth on labour or human rights soul. But the 
question is, whose soul is the EU reading? Whose values? This brings back to the Kantian dilemma 
of asking how to achieve peace. There is a need to find the right balance in our times between 
mutual interference and mutual deference. Trade for good calls for interference. But at the same 
time, Kant himself called for avoiding at all cost the kind of colonial interference that he saw in his 
time. One question that arises is whether the EU wants to project itself in the world as an actor that 
has been invented in Europe to mitigate power symmetry, to be an anti-hegemonic project inside 
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his own borders: how does it legitimise projecting power outside? It may not have to, and live with 
the contradictions. Why this inconsistency then? The answer is – because this is the world we live 
in.  
 
The third frame-point relates to the problematisation of the EU itself and the relationship between 
the ‘internal’ and the ‘external.’ What is it about the EU that makes what it does outside legitimate? 
We represent a kind of credo for universalism multilateralism. It is known what this means for the 
rest of the world – the self-image. We cannot be too self-reflective. At the same time, do not we 
need to rescue the rescue narrative? We want to do good in the world, maybe we can still rescue 
this narrative. But only if we are well aware of two fundamental tropes in this narrative. One is the 
trope of hierarchy, as Gammage mentioned in her presentation. The idea inherited from XIX 
century, that Europe at the time, could be and should be the gatekeeper for access for the 
international society. The very first international organisations and health and communication, we 
decide who passes the test of standards of civilization and create that hierarchy. We are not there 
yet. We created the UN and hierarchies over right. But it is pivotal to always be wary of this trope 
of gatekeeping that the EU might top.  
 
The second bit of the civilizational discourse that is always perceived by others, especially 
obviously in the former colonised world, is that of denial of agency to the other side and loss of 
self-determination, and so on. That is always what we run against, whether you were talking about 
Vietnam or Korea, how do we do this? Of course, there is a kind of infinite regress there, because 
we might want to talk about agency of some other country. How do we promote through trade 
certain standards while respecting their agency? On the other hand, we might care about agency 
inside those countries, for those who are less empowered within. We might say well we bypass 
government agency if we do not find it that legitimate because we want to empower women or 
workers. But then how do we choose? Is not that another kind of interference when is that 
legitimate or not? This leads us to think about our role in the global governance agenda in trade 
and regulation, as maybe necessarily to participate, rather than promote. That is the bigger frame 
for the thinking about the EU in the world, that in our policies, especially in trade because that is 
our main instrument of power. We need to move from post as reproduction of old patterns of 
gatekeeping and denial of agency to post as transcending because of self-awareness. It is not just 
a kind of normative imperative. And those questions are about the credibility of Europe in the world, 
and therefore its legitimacy, and therefore its effectiveness. It is in itself a discourse of power. 
Finally, that discourse is not necessarily served by saying we will be more effective by being more 
united, by having one voice. We need to problematise that question and in terms of our legitimate 
power. It may be that the many facets of diversity in Europe, and how we negotiate diversity in how 
we project power externally itself is a source of legitimacy.  
 
This leads to the other point that is related to self-reflectiveness about the EU. The consistency 
not just in terms of how we think about power, but indeed about ‘internal’ and ‘external’ on the free 
data flow zone, but also more broadly the vulnerability that we may have in terms of accusation of 
hypocrisy double standards. This echoes Gammage’s point: we may want to “pink-wash”, “green-
wash”, external trade deals. But what have we done internally? Do not we need to start with the 
awareness that the EU does not apply trade instruments internally to uphold what we would call 
the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, the holy trinity of democracy rule of law and human rights? Why- 
because we are ‘beyond this’ in the EU. We have rules and we have common understanding. But 
these are based on an underlying assumption that we have mutually recognised our legal and 
political systems. We mingle our laws. But we need to ask the question, how credible this is vis-a-
vis the rest of the world, including questions about the European Parliament for instance, as the 
guardian of these values. Is it consistent internally and externally? The moment of consistency with 
the new trade, the way we come out from the top from the current COVID crisis. The new great 
Green New Deal, the grounds for the external border tax on environment - how will not reconcile 
the ‘internal’ and the ‘external’? That is a framing question. Perhaps, the three types of actors that 
the EU wants to be can be in the international system, when it comes to trade-regulatory nexus.  
 
These paradigms have different status in both our practices and our imaginary. First, there is an 
old paradigm of EU as a model. The ‘model’ talk is an epistemic power. In the 80s and early 90s, 
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the EU could ‘show the way’. As Melo Araujo made very clear, that is a train that has passed. The 
way in which the EU went beyond the national treatment, through mutual recognition. It was 
through such a complex way of managing mutual recognition. That is not reproducible because in 
the rest of the world there is no direct effect. It is needed, because the underlying trust is also only 
possible due to our ecosystem and of course it is not a blind trust. Nevertheless, this underlying 
discourse that the EU can and should be a model still comes in the infamous kind of ‘sea water 
snake’. But the bigger structural problem is that of conceptual constitutionalisation, the danger that 
we raised in promoting our way of doing things globally is the idea that we would over 
constitutionalise WTO and the global governance system in ways that cannot be upheld globally. 
That echoes to this day because they are in different locus, the eternal dance between law and 
politics and the extent to which big political decisions can be made by judicial pronouncements.  
 
The symmetries of power matter, it does matter for developing countries, whether we would have 
frozen intellectual property rights in the WTO. Especially at a time when the EU and the US were 
promoting this embedding liberalism. The idea that we would then push for constitutionalisation 
enshrining into superior law. This dis-embedding was seen as illegitimate globally and this is part 
of what explains what happened later when the Doha Round. It can be argued that hegemonic 
stability theory tells us that it can be legitimate to use one to fuse power and purpose to create a 
stable international system. Either passively - that is the Brussels effects or one can use gravity, 
or through an increasing degree of more active strategies. And when we come back to the question 
of strategic autonomy and the world we live in. Even unilateral decisions can have their own 
legitimacy, based on hegemonic power. Voluntariness is so important, because there is a whole 
EU discourse of choice, other actors decide to interact with us they have choice. but in a world of 
asymmetric structure where is really this this choice it's a very different world. When we negotiate 
TTIP with the US and when we negotiate with trade agreement with Vietnam.  
 
Secondly, there is the question of slippery slope - how far do you go in sanction in what in IR is 
called ‘liberal crusading through trade.’ Thirdly, the question of hypocrisy of motives, or at least the 
contradictory motives as is perceived from the outside. Adequacy decisions that should be driven 
by adequacy. But in fact, we know whether it is from Brexit or any other area where we do 
adequacy that they are driven also by reciprocity, commercial considerations, strategic 
considerations and so on. The EU always needs to negotiate legitimation from protection of 
consumer or own stability and competition. Now we might call competition unfair. But that is in the 
eyes of the beholder. What is clear, is that in today's world, perhaps legitimately, the EU is worried 
about competition period in the AI and digital world, in terms of enforcing on some sort of strategic 
survival. But these are different logics. To what extent can we continue to be opaque and put them 
together? At least, as scholars, we can separate them and say we do this for good reasons of 
security protection. It would be healthy to be more explicit about this distinction. The crux of the 
problem here for the EU is to confront the issue of symmetry. What we are seeing with Brexit, and 
which will spill over more broadly, is the demand for reciprocity, mutuality, symmetry. For the EU, 
as any actor, this great trade-off dealing with the demands for symmetry through participation at 
the centre. Basically, the all affected principle is we would tend to political theory, but that leads to 
the EU being ‘the victim of its own success’.  
 
Moreover, sometimes it is the other way around. With Brexit, the EU suggests Britain to work 
together. Britain wishes to live its own life. There are limits to inclusive governance. The trade-off 
there is to say: if we co-develop these standards we need to think about ways of asserting 
deference to the other side. How much discretion do we leave the other side? Who decides? We 
have the second paradigm of the EU as a regulatory hegemon and the power and normative limits 
of that, which is linked to a third paradigm: the EU as a stakeholder in governance and global 
governance and actor, which from its normative and material power can actually affect global 
governance for the better. There are a number of points that were one of the narrative: that the EU 
can move from a narrative of liberalisation to regulation. Here is where we are in the trade-
regulatory nexus. We are increasingly driven by the second leg as we were driven by the first. 
Speaking of regulation – by who and whose rule? It is more than the good old idea of cooperation.  
 
We need to ask: what about the inequalities in regulatory capacities, regulatory development that 
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we see in the rest of the world? How do we think about localising the appropriate rules in a world 
where, with Covid-19, we are seeing increasingly that differentiation and localisation of rules is 
paramount? How do we deal with this: a holistic regime cluster dimension of international 
cooperation? Rather, the question is, who is made to adjust and who is always bearing the cost of 
adjustment? And how does that spill over from one regime to the to the other? A second point is 
on the rules governing mutual interference. What are the standards? The reference should not be 
EU standards but global standards. Sometimes they are uploaded from the EU or downloaded to 
the EU. But nevertheless, if the bias has its global standards, we still need to ask the question, 
where is the discretion for interpretation? We saw this with the WHO, recently. The power is still 
nested in interpretation.  
 
Secondly, even if we talk about global standards and we can even globalise interpretation- what 
kind of standards do we privilege? Do we privilege process? That is sort of a way of granting 
agency or allowing for agency. But even if we accept that, in many cases process standards be 
privileged, what kind of the power configurations exists within countries? Back to Gammage’s point 
– there might be formal reference in terms of standards for what we are looking for other countries. 
There are the actual structural effects of trade liberalisation, for instance on women, which are so 
important. Certainly, there were questions about scope and inclusiveness. We have the good old 
problems of digital apartheid and ways to manage it. Why inclusiveness in this increasingly 
plurilateral world of WTO? How can the EU be the opposite of the gatekeeper the guardian of 
inclusiveness, not just formally, but materially?  
 
Perhaps most important is the whole question of democratisation. The European public is 
connecting in different ways, but they are trying to protect their own social contracts, whether 
national or European. How does that affect the social contracts of the other side in the case of 
CETA? When we talk about democratisation of trade inside the EU, it is always about the effects 
within the EU rather than the kind of impact we have on other countries. Finally, how can we think 
about democratisation, not just as a question of vertical demand for accountability of a trade world 
that that is very close into itself, but one about the distributed intelligence that XXI century relies 
on for democratisation? 
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